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ASSUMING PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
IMPROVING THE ENVIRONMENT: MOVING TOWARD
A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL NORM
Hope M. Babcock*
“Congress recognizes . . . that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment.”1
This is the second in a series of three articles about the need to make individu-
als behave more environmentally responsibly because of the aggregate impact of
their activities on the environment, and how that might be done.  The Article uses as
a springboard the dissonance between continuing strong public support for environ-
mental protection and individual actions that contradict that support.  The Article
argues that norms, once activated and internalized, can overcome some of the barri-
ers to reforming individual behavior.  However, for norms to influence individual
behavior there must be an effective public education campaign accompanied by
carefully tailored supplemental measures, such as sanctions and market-based in-
centives.  Although not as specifically developed in this Article as in the other two, I
argue that the phenomenon of global climate change has created a window of op-
portunity within which environmental norm change can occur.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is general agreement that we are nearing the end of achieving
major gains in pollution abatement from traditional sources, that a signifi-
cant portion of the remaining environmental problems facing this country is
caused by individual behavior, and that efforts to control that behavior have
either failed or not even been made.2
The thousands or millions of potential individual regulatory targets
for any given environmental problem, the widespread belief that
individuals are not significant pollution sources, and the cognitive
barriers to changing that belief all make individual behavior ex-
tremely difficult to regulate through command and control instru-
ments, particularly at the federal level.3
The phenomenon of individuals as irresponsible environmental actors seems
counterintuitive when polls show that people consistently rate protecting the
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  I thank Georgetown for its gen-
erous support of my scholarship and my research assistant Angela Navarro for her invaluable
assistance.
1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 101(c), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (2000).
2 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated
Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 520 (2004); see also Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying
California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1276 (2000).
3 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 598; see also Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters out of R
Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 197-201 (1998) (explaining how
opposition to federal initiatives to reduce driving led to the repeal of the Clean Air Act’s
employee trip reduction directive).
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environment among their highest priorities, contribute to environmental
causes, and are willing to pay more to protect environmental resources.4
This Article is my second effort at understanding why people who con-
sider themselves to be “environmentalists” or support environmental causes
behave in environmentally destructive ways, and what, if anything, can be
done to change that behavior.5  The first article endorsed expansion of the
abstract environmental protection norm to include individual environmental
responsibility6 and concluded that doing this is the most promising approach
to overcoming barriers to behavioral change.  That article also identified en-
vironmental groups as the most effective “norm entrepreneurs” that can
bring about widespread change in personal environmental conduct through
carefully tailored information campaigns.7  This Article expands on the ear-
lier article’s discussion of the role norms play in influencing personal behav-
ior and why changing them is a critical part of any campaign to make
individuals more environmentally responsible.
The best way to change norms is through education, as the first article
acknowledged, but supplemental measures may be necessary.  This Article
identifies what those additional measures might be and assesses their effec-
tiveness.  A third article will explore how republican theory supports the
critical role that education performs in altering public behavior through
changing norms.8  All three articles rest on the premise that the global cli-
mate change crisis has created circumstances in which norm change can take
place, namely the occurrence of a second environmental republican moment,
in which people are open to being educated about their civic responsibilities,
including those pertaining to the environment.
4 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activa-
tion Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1117-18 (2005) (noting that
despite “widespread support” for the environmental protection norm, individual action is often
inconsistent with it). But see Andra´s Taka´cs-Sa´nta, Barriers to Environmental Concern, 14
HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 26 (2007) (“[The] high level of environmental concern measured in
polls may in part reflect social expectations rather than real concern . . . .”).
5 Defining “correct” environmental behavior is problematic.  Sometimes all possible be-
haviors will result in some type of environmental harm, especially if the indirect effects of that
behavior are included.  Additionally, when the effects of the behavior are not easy to compare,
what may seem like intuitively correct behavior — using reusable coffee mugs instead of
paper cups — may actually be incorrect when the water supply is limited and landfill space is
not.
6 See Hope M. Babcock, Global Climate Change: A Civic Republican Moment for Achiev-
ing Broader Changes in Environmental Behavior, 26 PACE L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
7 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996)
(defining “norm entrepreneurs” as “people interested in changing social norms,” who when
successful, produce “norm bandwagons,” which are created when small changes in behavior
result in large ones, and “norm cascades,” which happen when there are “rapid shifts in
norms”).
8 See Hope M. Babcock, Civic Republicanism Provides Theoretical Support for Making
Individuals More Environmentally Responsible, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
(forthcoming 2009).
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To develop these ideas, Section II provides background information
about individual contributions to environmental problems.9  Section III dis-
cusses various barriers to changing personal environmental behavior, such as
the role federal laws play in perpetuating the myth that only industry is re-
sponsible for environmental harm.  That Section also explores certain cogni-
tive heuristics that influence how people process information and personal
barriers to changing behavior such as habits, inconvenience, cost, unavaila-
bility of alternatives, and self-interest.  The role of norms in influencing be-
havior and how norms are formed and changed are examined in Section IV.
Next, Section V investigates how a new norm of environmental responsibil-
ity might arise and displace competing norms.  However, that Section recog-
nizes that the development of a new norm may not be an easy task because
of some of the same barriers identified in Section III.  In Section VI, ac-
knowledging that neither norms nor the happenstance of an environmental
republican moment will inexorably lead to changes in personal behavior,
various norm- and behavior-changing tools, such as public education, sham-
ing and other sanctions, and market-based incentives are identified.  Section
VI examines the inherent strengths and weaknesses of these tools, as well as
particular problems with their application to individual behavior.  Section
VII concludes that no single approach will work, but a combination of any
or all of the above, depending on the source and nature of the problem, is
called for.  However, any combination of tools must include public educa-
tion if a permanent new environmental norm is to emerge and change indi-
vidual behavior in the long term.
II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUALS TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
One of the serious challenges to changing behavior is the perception
that individual contributions to environmental problems are small and, there-
fore, inconsequential.  People’s misapprehension of their role as a causative
factor in environmental degradation leads them to resist changing their be-
havior, especially when behavior change is costly or inconvenient.10  Over a
decade ago, former Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Wil-
liam Ruckelshaus recognized that fact:
9 I adopt Michael Vandenbergh and Anne Steinemann’s definition of individual behavior,
“those behaviors that are under the direct, substantial control of the individual.”  Michael P.
Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1673, 1690 (2007).
10 See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and
Control, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 191, 198-99 (2001) (“[R]esistance to centralized automobile
emissions testing programs has been strong in many states.  Restrictions on non-point sources
of water pollution have been no more popular.”); see also Joel Connelly, Earth Day 2000:
Local Efforts Reflect Global Goals, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 21, 2000, at A1 (“If
you go into any city, 80% of the people would agree that the Clean Air Act should be strength-
ened . . . .  But if you ask them to spend 20 minutes a year in a vehicle inspection program,
80% will resist.” (quoting William Ruckelshaus)).
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[T]he most significant threats to our environment now seem to lie,
not with major industrial sites, but in the habits of ordinary Ameri-
cans: we like to drive big powerful cars, use a lot of electricity,
generate a lot of waste, enjoy cheap food, live in grassy suburbs,
and collectively send pollution in massive amounts to often distant
waterways and airsheds.11
Each one of us pollutes “when we drive our cars, fertilize and mow our
yards, pour household chemicals on the ground or down the drain, and en-
gage in myriad other common activities.  Although each activity contributes
minute amounts of pollutants, when aggregated across millions of individu-
als, the total amounts are stunning.”12  The result is that while industrial
sources continue to be a major cause of pollution, individuals are now the
largest remaining source of many pollutants.
Individuals release almost a third of the chemicals that form low-level
ozone or smog.13  Households discharge as much mercury to wastewater as
do all large industrial facilities combined.14  Common household products,
like soft drinks, and toiletries, like shaving cream, deodorants, soap, sham-
poo, toothpaste, mouthwash, and detergents, are responsible for nearly 15%
of mercury found in domestic wastewater.15  Individuals also release mer-
cury when they dispose of household products, batteries, fluorescent light-
ing, thermometers, and electronic equipment like cell phones and computers
in landfills or along the sides of roads.16  Individuals discharge “fifty times
more benzene than all large industrial facilities combined and five times
more formaldehyde.”17  In 1997, home and garden pesticide use was roughly
140 million pounds, which accounted for 11% of total pesticide use.18
Ninety-five percent of urban carbon monoxide emissions come from
tailpipes and minor source emissions; lawn and garden equipment emits
62% of the carbon monoxide from non-road sources.19  Individuals directly
generate approximately one-third of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, and
11 William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 25, 26-
27.
12 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 518; see also Manik Roy, Pollution Prevention, Organi- R
zational Culture, and Social Learning, 22 ENVTL. L. 189, 192-93 (1992) (“We all waste.  We
all potentially pollute.”).
13 In the Los Angeles metropolitan area, these same sources release 80% of all smog-
forming compounds.  Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103. R
14 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 519. R
15 Id. at 563.
16 Id. at 564.  Of recent concern is the mercury in new compact fluorescent light bulbs
(“CFLs”).  Editorial That Newfangled Light Bulb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at WK11 (dis-
cussing the five milligrams of mercury in each CFL and saying “the dangers are real and
growing”).  The total annual release of mercury to wastewater from all households in the
United States is 1,749 pounds, compared to “the total quantity released to surface water from
all large industrial facilities in 2001,” 1,805 pounds.  Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 564 n.81. R
17 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 519.  Benzene is found in solvents and gasoline.  Formal- R
dehyde is found in fungicides and herbicides.
18 Id. at 576 (citing EPA estimate).
19 Id. at 542 n.95; see also id. at 559 (“Individuals contributed at least 30.6% of the total
amount of ozone precursors produced in the United States in 1998.”).
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one-third of the energy consumed in this country is used by households.20
Motor vehicles, consumer products, and other small, non-industrial sources
now contribute 76% of all air toxins.21  According to a 2003 National Re-
search Council Report, recreational boats alone “release 1.47 million gallons
of petroleum annually, a total that comprises approximately 5% of the total
releases of petroleum from all human-related activities.”22
The risks arising from individual polluting behavior, such as the use
and disposal of household cleansers containing toxic substances, are often
equal to or greater than those arising from industrial sources, especially
since the pollution occurs near the user and other members of her house-
hold.23  “Measured levels of pollutants in the air inside homes have ex-
ceeded by several times the levels in the ambient air, and indoor air pollution
is a leading human exposure route for many toxics.”24  Additionally, releases
of toxic chemicals by individuals happen in places where they are more
likely to expose sensitive subpopulations, because children, the elderly, and
the sick “are more likely to breathe indoor air or the air inside a motor
vehicle than to breathe air contaminated by air toxics released from a distant
factory.”25
The individual’s share of the total pollutant load appears “to be growing
as population, consumption, and activity levels increase, and as command
and control and other regulatory instruments reduce emissions from large
industrial sources.”26  For example, the relatively stable percentage of total
nitrogen oxide (NOx) and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions con-
tributed by on-road motor vehicles comes from substantial reductions in per-
vehicle tailpipe emissions being offset by the increasing popularity of larger,
more polluting pickup trucks and SUVs.27  Increased population and activity
levels and greater population dispersal have also resulted in the number of
vehicles on the road and the vehicle miles traveled more than doubling since
20 Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1676 (greenhouse gas emissions); John C. R
Dernbach, Harnessing Individual Behavior To Address Climate Change: Options for Con-
gress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 119 (2008) (energy consumption).
21 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103. R
22 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 582.  Richard Lazarus considers this “low-hanging fruit” R
that can easily be reduced.  Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change:
Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future 42 (Nov. 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
23 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1152 (citing a number of government studies). R
24 Id.
25 Id. at 1153; see Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 542 n.96.  Vandenbergh explains that R
“[a]s cars drive down the road, the emissions from other cars enter the ventilation system . . . .
[O]ne study concluded that the levels of some air pollutants inside motor vehicles exceed the
levels in the ambient air . . . [creating a] ‘person cloud’ effect.”  Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at R
1153.  Sensitive ecosystems are also more prone to direct individual source pollution. See id.
(noting that “personal watercraft release petroleum in various ways and are often used in
estuaries that are particularly vulnerable to petroleum contamination”).
26 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 539. R
27 Id. at 557-58.  According to a mid-1990s EPA estimate, “SUVs release two-thirds more
NOx and VOCs” annually than other automobiles. Id. at 558 n.155.
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1970,28 neutralizing gains in emission reductions.29  A single discharge of
pollution into a river or a lake may be barely detectable, but “the cumulative
impact of numerous, smaller discharges can destroy ecosystems, render
water unusable, and jeopardize public health.”30  Similarly, environmental
injury from the random dumping of household trash, dilapidated furniture,
shopping carts, plastic bags and bottles, car batteries, tires and even entire
cars into rivers can be as severe in the long run as a steady stream of pollu-
tion from an industrial or wastewater pipe.31
Personal consumption is also a serious source of environmental
problems.  For example, in 1998, the automobile industry produced thirty-
eight million cars, raising the global fleet from fifty-three million in 1950 to
508 million.32  At the same time, the number of people per car declined by
almost 80% over the past fifty years.33  “In the aggregate, global consump-
tion achieved a level that is almost historically inconceivable: Measured in
constant dollars, the world’s people have consumed as many goods and ser-
vices since 1950 as all previous generations put together.”34  According to
Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Prime Minister of Norway, “[i]t is simply
impossible for the world as a whole to sustain a Western level of consump-
tion for all.  In fact, if seven billion people were to consume as much energy
and resources as we do in the West today we would need ten worlds, not
one, to satisfy all our needs.”35  Many of the decisions that individual con-
sumers make reflect highly personal lifestyle decisions, such as where they
want to live, work, drive, and shop, even when people buy “green.”36
Luxury goods often exact a large environmental toll.37  Air travel uses
40% more fuel than automobiles on a per-passenger, per-kilometer basis.38
28 Id. at 557-58.
29 Id.; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 196 (“Although emissions from motor R
vehicles have declined substantially on a per-automobile basis since 1970, the number of mo-
tor vehicles has increased by well over [forty] million, and the number of vehicle miles trav-
eled . . . per vehicle has increased by 140%.”).  A recent report states that the reductions in
carbon dioxide emissions from the 40% increase in fuel economy standards for cars and light-
duty trucks that Congress enacted in December 2007 may well be wiped out by a 50% increase
in vehicle miles traveled during the same period. See Steven D. Cook, Growth in Vehicle
Travel May Wipe Out Emissions Reductions from New CAFE Bill, 39 Env’t Rep. BNA 158,
158 (Jan. 25, 2008).
30 Robin L. Greenwald, What’s the “Point” of the Clean Water Act Following United
States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc.?:  The Second Circuit Acts as a Legislator Rather
Than as a Court, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 689, 720-21 (1994).
31 Id. at 721.
32 Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 712 (2003).
33 Id.
34 Id. (quoting ALAN THEIN DURING, HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? 29 (1992))
35 Gro Harlem Brundtland, Oslo Symposium on Sustainable Consumption (Jan. 19-20,
1994).
36 See Monica Hesse, Greed in the Name of Green, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2008, at C1
(quoting environmentalists as saying that “buying green” is an “oxymoron,” and that the
“greenest products are the ones you don’t buy”); Shankar Vedantam, On Climate, Symbols
Can Overshadow Substance, WASH. POST, May 17, 2008, at A1.
37 Kysar, supra note 32, at 722. R
38 Id.; see also id. at 712 (noting that “air travel,” which is highly polluting, “now ac-
counts for five percent of annual world oil consumption”).
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“Each kilogram of red meat requires three thousand liters of water, the
equivalent of two liters of gasoline in petrochemicals and other farm inputs,
and five kilograms of corn and meal that otherwise could be used to feed
humans.”39  The fashion industry, which changes styles at least four times a
year, induces people to dispose of their clothes prematurely, which “carries
a heavy environmental cost, including the use of pesticides and water for
cotton farming, chemicals for synthetic fabric production, intense grazing for
wool and leather, and hazardous industrial dyes for coloration.”40  “[T]he
competitive consumer continually trades in goods for the latest model with
the latest features.  The consumer desires simply to possess something that
relative[ly] few others are capable of attaining, an observable symbol that
signifies success under prevailing social norms.”41
Richard Stewart refers to these small sources of pollution as “second
generation environmental problems,” which must be “significantly cur-
tailed” if the country is to continue to progress environmentally in light of
sustained economic growth.42  As the population increases and economic
growth responds, the burden on industry in meeting environmental standards
may become overwhelming and ultimately counterproductive for the econ-
omy as a whole.  For example, many areas of the country cannot meet the
new national ozone standard without reducing car use and speeds, the use of
non-road vehicles, consumer product use, and residential burning.43  But,
most of these activities are outside the scope of our environmental laws,
which focus on industrial polluters or manufacturers of harmful products.44
Even if there were laws that reached these activities, there would be
serious problems enforcing them.  Efforts to detect and ultimately enforce
against individual activities that usually occur at home or in the immediately
surrounding area would trigger enormous political resistance, as they would
be seen as an interference with individual liberty and an invasion of privacy.
Such initiatives would also be resource-intensive for the government to carry
out.  Moreover, the questionable behavior may be perfectly legal (driving a
gas-guzzling, pollutant-emitting Hummer) or publicly acceptable (littering).
39 Id. at 722.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 723; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1234 n.11 (“Consumer preferences for R
certain types of products and behaviors can become norms precisely because those preferences
are heavily shaped by factors exogenous to the individual consumer.”); Hesse, supra note 36, R
at C1 (“[C]onsuming until you’re squeaky green.  It feels so good.  It looks so good.  It feels
so good to look so good, which is why conspicuousness is key.”).  Kysar describes a “con-
sumption ‘arms race’” that can be set off when two individuals each “desire to own the largest
sport-utility vehicle on the block.”  Kysar, supra note 32, at 720. R
42 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 29 (2001).
43 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1156 n.239. R
44 See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 3001(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d)
(2000) (authorizing EPA to set less stringent standards for small generators of hazardous
waste); see also Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Preven-
tion Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1992).
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It is unlikely that Congress will amend our environmental laws to reach
individual actions.  “A formal change in statutory or regulatory law . . .
requires concerted collective action; large numbers of people must see a
problem, agree that it needs quick action, and commit their time and re-
sources to providing that action.”45  This inertia “is even more pronounced
when regulation is sought in an area where unrestricted individual choice has
been (or is perceived to have been) the norm.”46
III. BARRIERS TO CHANGING PERSONAL ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOR
Thirty years of polling data show that the “abstract norm favoring pro-
tection of human health and the environment is widely held, stable, and in-
fluential.”47  Indeed, “environmentalist attitudes are now well-nigh
omnipresent in American society.”48  So, why does individual behavior in-
consistent with that norm persist?
A specific behavior is “a product of an opportunity and intent, the latter
of which is a product of knowledge and attitudes.”49  Changing personal
environmental behaviors, especially “those linked to Western cultural values
such as independence, freedom, social mobility, or security,” is challeng-
ing.50  Equally difficult is doing this in a society where “[m]essages about
conservation behaviors compete with an overwhelming number of advertise-
ments for consumptive actions that promise economic viability, status, and
pleasure.”51 It takes very little to dissuade people from forming new inten-
tions and changing their behavior when those intentions are formed by per-
sonal attitudes about whether engaging in the new behavior will result in
positive results, social pressure concerning the desirability of the new behav-
ior, and having control over the behavior.52  The task is further complicated
by the many barriers that lie in the way, which can easily defeat all but the
most firmly entrenched intentions.53
45 Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 325, 346 (2002).
46 Id.
47 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1117; see also Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure R
in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 64-65 (1992). But see Taka´cs-Sa´nta, supra
note 4, at 26 (noting that the “high level of environmental concern” reflected in public opinion R
polls is neither “overwhelming” nor uniformly intense and may merely reflect public adher-
ence to a perceived social norm or behavioral expectation).
48 Farber, supra note 47, at 65. R
49 Martha C. Monroe, Two Avenues for Encouraging Conservation Behaviors, 10 HUM.
ECOLOGY REV. 113, 115 (2003).
50 Id. at 123.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 116 (describing Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen’s Theory of Reasoned Action and
Ajzen’s modification resulting in the Theory of Planned Behavior).  Monroe uses these models
to show how the intent to recycle results not from information about resource recovery or
general attitudes about environmental protection, but from attitudes about recycling, percep-
tions of recycling social norms, and a “perceived ability to recycle.” Id.
53 Id. at 115.
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This Section discusses the barriers to creating an environmental norm
and changing personal behavior.  The Section first talks about how federal
laws further the myth that only industry groups are to blame.  Then, the
discussion turns to the cognitive barriers that account for the persistence of
the myth by providing a brief explanation of cognitive dissonance and by
discussing in more detail specific cognitive barriers, for example the way
people process information, the alarmist and optimist biases, and the fact
that the focus on biodiversity makes people care less about the ordinary en-
vironment.  Next, the Section identifies personal barriers to norm and behav-
ior change.  These barriers can arise for several reasons, including: habits are
hard to change; individuals have trouble conforming environmental views to
consumer preferences; people have difficulty with self-restraint and personal
sacrifice;54 and changing personal behavior is grounded in self-interest, mak-
ing people unwilling to engage in costly and inconvenient alternative behav-
ior.  The Section ends by discussing why the nature of environmental
problems makes it particularly difficult to determine the “correct” behavior.
The challenge in creating a new environmental norm is “particularly
great because the American public believes a number of environmental
myths,” one of which “incorrectly attribute[s] the causes of many remain-
ing environmental problems to industrial point sources, rather than to indi-
vidual behavior.”55  People “consistently underestimate their relative share
of emissions as compared to industrial sources.”56  In fact, individuals may
be unaware that they are contributing to the remaining environmental
problems at all.57  Environmental surveys infrequently inquire about what
people think the sources of environmental harms are; those that do reveal
that people rarely attribute the problems to their own behavior.58  For exam-
ple, a 1974 poll showed that people’s concerns about cars were focused on
manufacturers, not the people who drive cars.59  One reason for the tenacity
of these myths may be the government’s failure to address individual sources
of environmental harm.  The problems the government has in identifying and
quantifying the impacts of individual sources on the environment and in de-
signing responsive requirements and enforcement mechanisms reinforce the
54 See generally Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1697-98; see also P. Wesley R
Schultz & Lynnette Zelezny, Reframing Environmental Messages To Be Congruent with Amer-
ican Values, 10 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 126, 131 (2003) (noting that messages asking the public
to protect the environment are “framed as requiring sacrifice — conservation requires using
less, simpler living, giving up some of the comforts that are available, and incurring greater
inconvenience — for the sake of a broader goal” and are generally not persuasive with people
who have not endorsed environmental goals).
55 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 192.  National environmental groups perpetuate this R
myth by sending out fundraising appeals that target the government or industrial sources; they
certainly do not implicate prospective donors in the “blame game.” See also Lisa Heinzerling,
Minnesota Wild, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2002).
56 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1130. R
57 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 197. R
58 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1130; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 198. R
59 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1131 n.127 (citing a Harris Public Opinion Poll). R
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belief that individuals are not responsible for environmental harm.60  The
lack of general public understanding about human health and ecological sys-
tems may also lead individuals to underestimate their part in causing
pollution.61
The regulatory command and control system that is reflected in most of
our major environmental laws may have contributed to the persistence of
this myth by indirectly conveying “a second social meaning,” namely that
industrial polluters are the source of environmental problems, and individu-
als “are part of the solution.”62  These laws principally target industrial and
manufacturing sources and impose regulatory requirements and penalties on
those sources.  Individuals, on the other hand, are authorized to help enforce
these laws under citizen suit provisions.63  Even “[p]rograms directed at
second generation problems, such as the [Clean Air Act’s] Employee Com-
mute Options Program . . . have been interpreted to provide for enforcement
against employers, not individuals.”64  The implicit message sent to the pub-
lic by those early environmental laws “may have facilitated public myths
about the role of second generation sources, [which] . . . in turn may have
impeded the development of norms regarding individual responsibility for
environmental problems.”65
Another reason for the persistence of these myths may be a form of
cognitive dissonance, the “inability to hold contradictory views of oneself at
the same time.”66  When people are subject to inconsistent thoughts or dis-
crepancies between their thoughts and actions, they usually try to resolve
those contradictions.  However, if this cannot be easily done, then people are
inclined to wall off or sidestep information that makes them feel bad about
themselves or the actions they are taking.67  This problem appears to be par-
60 See Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 212-13. R
61 “[S]urveys demonstrate that individuals’ understanding of basic human health and eco-
logical processes is minimal.  Similarly, private individuals’ understanding of their role in
causing pollution is remarkably low. . . . [T]he available data suggest that individuals system-
atically underestimate their role.”  Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 591. R
62 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 211; see also James Paul Kimmel, Jr., Disclosing the R
Environmental Impact of Human Activities: How a Federal Pollution Control Program Based
on Individual Decision Making and Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the Environmental
Goals of the 1970s in the 1990s, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 523 (1989) (complaining about the
government’s failure to target “the sector of the economy that controls the use and disposal of
products, and ultimately producer behavior—the consumer sector”); Vandenbergh, supra note
2, at 620 (recognizing the enormity of the change in focus by regulatory agencies, if they were
suddenly to target individual normal behavior in addition to illegal activities by businesses and
manufacturers).
63 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 305, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000); Clean Air Act § 304, 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972
(2000).
64 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 210 n.99. R
65 Id. at 213.
66 Id. at 208; see also Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1698 (calling this R
“bounded rationality”).
67 Monroe suggests that individuals must be confronted with “the hypocrisy of their ac-
tions to significantly arouse dissonance and provide the motivation to adopt a behavior that
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ticularly acute when environmental values68 are at issue because it is difficult
for a person who supports environmental protection to recognize that her
actions may actually be degrading the environment.69  Cognitive dissonance,
therefore, can lead people to blame “corporate polluters as the only impor-
tant sources of environmental harms . . . [because that gives them] someone
else to blame.”70  Additionally, when the task is difficult or inconvenient,
like bringing used solvents to a household hazardous waste collection center
or avoiding driving, “the easier solution is to . . . avoid any inquiry into the
effects of our behavior.”71  Cognitive dissonance affects not only a person’s
understanding of where pollution is coming from, but also her estimate of
the harm it may cause.72
The way people process information creates its own problems.  The
common errors that people make when they do this are legion, especially
with regard to information about potential harms.73  For example, people
consistently “overestimate their knowledge about a decision, evaluate infor-
mation and attribute causality in very different ways based upon the framing
of the information . . . .  [They] make stereotypical decisions and select
information to support them based on conclusions reached before receiving
data about those decisions.”74  Most people also “prefer [information that
reduces hypocrisy.”  Monroe, supra note 49, at 119.  Taka´cs-Sa´nta explains how people R
“calm” themselves when faced with negative feelings, by suppressing such thoughts or by
trivializing or denying them.  This can include trivializing “human responsibility (especially
our own) for environmental problems,” which can lead to a decrease in concern for the envi-
ronment.  Taka´cs-Sa´nta, supra note 4, at 35; see also Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, R
International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 904.
68 Monroe, supra note 49, at 119.  The term “environmental values” or what is considered R
good environmental behavior is largely contextual. See also Lori M. Hunter & Joan M.
Brehm, A Qualitative Examination of Value Orientations Toward Wildlife and Biodiversity by
Rural Residents of the Intermountain Region, 11 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 13, 24 (2004) (af-
firming “the importance of local context within value formation, and the myriad ways in
which individuals define ‘environmental value’”).
69 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 208. R
70 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 594. R
71 Id. at 612.
72 Id. at 593.
73 “[P]eople use heuristics, including those based on their prior experience, to process
information and deal with uncertainty.  Their perceptions of risks are affected by socioeco-
nomic variables and by their psychological saliency and accessibility may produce . . . distor-
tions.”  Stewart, supra note 42, at 141; see also Lazarus, supra note 22, at 24 (describing the R
“availability heuristic,” the tendency to judge the likelihood of an event based on one’s ability
to imagine that the event will happen) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availabil-
ity: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973));
Adam Douglas Henry, Public Perceptions of Global Warming, 7 HUM. ECOLOGY REV. 25, 29
(saying that “dramatic events are seen as more probable than equally or even more frequent
events that are less dramatic,” referring to this as the “availability heuristic”); Taka´cs-Sa´nta,
supra note 4, at 33 (explaining that the availability heuristic means that environmental R
problems that have not been personally experienced are considered to be more remote and less
of a problem than those that have been personally experienced).
74 Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV.
115, 129 (1993) (stating that “[c]ognitive psychology research suggests that these errors result
not from unconscious conflicts or other mental health factors, but from deficiencies in infor-
mation processing”).
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is] black-and-white over shades of gray” and have a tendency “to hold over-
simplified beliefs and to hold them with excessive confidence.”75  Given that
environmental issues are frequently in shades of gray, this cognitive problem
could be significant and may explain why it has taken so long for people to
absorb the complexity of environmental problems like global climate
change.76  The fact that people are also inclined “to anchor their decisions
stereotypically based upon their earlier conclusions, and use information
gained thereafter selectively to support those decisions”77 makes it harder to
persuade them to let go of their earlier impressions.78
The fact that people are inclined to suffer from an “alarmist bias” on
the one hand and an “optimistic bias” on the other can affect how they
perceive their own role as contributors to environmental problems.  The
alarmist bias is reflected in the difficulty “many people have in evaluating
low probability events [and in] . . . the fact that frightening information is
more salient and potent than comforting information.”79  An optimistic bias,
on the other hand, leads people “to underestimate their likelihood of having
accidents or contracting diseases,” enabling people to distance themselves
from the personal impact of using toxic substances in their houses or gar-
dens80 or to overestimate the capacity of the Earth to absorb environmental
harm.81  These two biases may account for the length of time it took people
to grasp the significance of global climate change, why events like Hurri-
cane Katrina have helped people to understand the problem, and why they
were reluctant to see themselves as contributors to the problem.  Richard
Lazarus attributes this behavior to “myopia,” saying that people think
75 See id. at 163 (arguing that “people will always be tempted by the idea that everything
that happens to them is controllable”) (quoting THOMAS GILOVITCH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT
ISN’T SO 186 (1991)).
76 Lazarus identifies three types of thinking about challenges unique to climate change
that may prevent people from understanding and then reacting to the phenomenon: “myopia
and climate change’s temporal dimension,” “the availability heuristic, space, and complexity,”
and the “representativeness heuristic and climate change cause and effect.”  Lazarus, supra
note 22, at 22, 24, 26. R
77 Shuman, supra note 74, at 162. R
78 See id. at 161. This may explain why the stories about burning rivers and Love Canal
were so central to the jurisgenerative moment of the 1960s and 1970s, and the lack of similar
stories today has shielded people from their own responsibility.
79 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 592. But see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: R
A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 55, 93 n.120 (2003) (arguing that “if the [frightening] imagery is too strong it
may backfire, leading the recipients to underestimate the probability of the event”).
80 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 592-93; see also Shuman, supra note 74, at 162. R
81 See Henry, supra note 73, at 29 (noting that dumping of toxins into the environment R
“has usually been justified by the immense capacity of the system to absorb these perturba-
tions”); see also Taka´cs-Sa´nta, supra note 4, at 32 (noting people will be less concerned with R
the environment if they believe that “natural systems are stable (robust and resilient), and can
easily adapt to human activities so these cannot really disturb them”); id. at 33-34.
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“ ‘mostly in physiological time’ and ‘natural selection favors the forces of
psychological denial.’” 82
People also have excessively steep discount rates, which induce
them to under-value the benefits of changes in behavior that will
not accrue for several years . . . [and which] may affect a wide
variety of environmentally significant behaviors such as invest-
ments in energy efficient (hence generally less polluting) cars, fur-
naces, and other equipment.83
A final cognitive barrier that may prevent people from focusing on their
own polluting activities is that people “are not wired to care about, or even
to notice, the ordinary.”84  Because so many things compete for attention,
people develop “a variety of filtering mechanisms to help [them] focus ef-
fectively on some things by more or less shutting out others.”85  One thing
that gets edited out is the environment in which we all function on a daily
basis, unless there is something in that background that is a distinguishing
feature, “a focal point that differentiates [it] from the background.  The or-
dinary, which constitutes the background itself, provides a poor focal
point.”86
For this reason, Holly Doremus worries that “a biodiversity strategy”
that focuses “on the special, the unique, or the extraordinary” will “inevita-
bly define[ ] the objects of our concern as something sharply apart from our
everyday experiences and our ordinary world,” which will encourage people
“to put nature out of sight and out of mind except during those rare moments
when we specifically choose to seek it out.”87  To Doremus, a “strategy of
segregating protected nature from human taint, and humans from the impacts
of nature, is likely to limit the strength of our commitment to nature protec-
tion in the future.”88  Even more troubling, a “strategy of designating a few
places for nature encourages us to believe that no more is required of us than
82 Lazarus, supra note 22, at 22; see also Taka´cs-Sa´nta, supra note 4, at 32 (stating that R
“temporal disjunction makes it more difficult to recognize causal relationships and gives way
to alternative explanation”).
83 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 593. R
84 Doremus, supra note 45, at 334. R
85 Id.
86 Id.  To the extent that people focus on things that are special, rare and threatened re-
sources like wolves or spotted owls, they are inclined “to discount the value of abundant
resources and to assume they will always be there.” Id. at 335.
87 Id. at 340; see also Holly Doremus, The Special Importance of Ordinary Places, 23
ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 3, 16 (2000) (“[T]he essence of our problem with nature
today is that we have not learned how to coexist with wild nature on this ever-smaller planet.
We cannot reach the point of co-existence until we recognize and accept that nature . . . be-
longs not just in extraordinary places or under extraordinary circumstances, but in ordinary
places and as a matter of course.  The rhetoric of specialness we have used in the past to justify
nature protection can never teach that lesson.  Only the message that nature is ordinary can do
so.  That may not be an easy message to convey . . . .”).
88 Doremus, supra note 45, at 342; see also Heinzerling, supra note 55, at 1140 (wonder- R
ing if the reason people shy away from talking about or even seeing the “spiritual side of our
work” is because “some of us spend too much time indoors”).
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leaving those special places inviolate.”89  While Doremus is directing her
comments toward biodiversity, they may relate to people’s willingness to see
the impact their own everyday activities have on their immediate, ordinary
environments.  Perhaps the failure to emphasize “what is special in the most
ordinary nature”90 — the nature that people live in or drive through — has
prevented people from being aware of how those areas are affected by the
most ordinary and commonplace activities, such as littering, roadside dump-
ing, pouring used oil down a storm drain, and using herbicides, or from
engaging in better environmental behavior.
Personal habits, which arise from “repeated interactions”91 and are very
hard to change, present another serious obstacle to changing personal behav-
ior.92  For example, the practice of solo commuting “is so deeply ingrained
in people’s behavioral patterns that efforts to affect those norms via the con-
tent of the law are doomed.”93  “By circumventing decisional processes,
habits save cognitive time and energy” and continue to control behavior,
even when it is expensive to maintain them.94  Thus, people continue to drive
alone or waste electricity by leaving lights on in rooms, even though these
are increasingly costly habits to maintain.  Habits become even harder to
overcome if the new behavior is inconvenient, requires significant effort or
is costly, like disposing of used car batteries at a hazardous waste collection
site rather than dumping them on the side of a road.95  It is hard to internalize
a norm of personal environmental responsibility when complying with such
a norm requires the abandonment of ingrained personal habits.
The fact that individual contributions are so small compared to the pol-
lution from an industrial polluter makes it hard to convince any one individ-
ual that changing her behavior will make a difference.96  As the Director of
the Office of Environmental Quality for Dallas said, after noting that one
89 Doremus, supra note 87, at 12; see also id. at 15 (arguing that “[o]nly by making the R
connection between special natural places and the everyday can we translate affection for
those special places into affection for all of nature”).
90 Id. at 15.
91 David R. Karp, The New Debate About Shame in Criminal Justice: An Interactionist
Account, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 301, 313 (2000) (quoting DENNIS H. WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF
ORDER: WHAT UNITES AND DIVIDES SOCIETY 48 (1994) (stating that habits “become expecta-
tions in the sense of predictions or anticipations of [individual] behavior” which pressure
individuals to meet those expectations “partly out of a feeling that the other will be irritated,
offended, or disappointed if the expectation is not fulfilled”)).
92 See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 594-95 (stating that “habits tend to truncate the R
traditional subjective expected utility calculation by creating a ‘habitual mindset’ . . .  [and
s]trong habits may also impede the influence of personal norms”).
93 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1262. R
94 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 595; see also Taka´cs-Sa´nta, supra note 4, at 34; cf. R
Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 596 (noting that “[o]nce a new habit (e.g., recycling) is ac- R
quired, however, it may be continued even if the costs of doing so are high”).
95 See Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1231-32 (2001).
96 Lazarus, discussing people’s perception of the causes of climate change, attributes this
phenomenon to the “representativeness heuristic” that enables people to understand the rela-
tionship between events and their consequences when they seem “logically related[, like] how
striking a match can lead to destruction by fire, or how breaching a dam can cause damage by
flood.”  Lazarus, supra note 22, at 26. R
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vehicle out of four in Texas is a pickup truck, “‘How do you reach an indi-
vidual citizen and tell them: Everybody makes a difference.’” 97  There is also
no visible immediate benefit to the person who behaves in an environmen-
tally responsible manner.  Assuming a benefit can be found, it is usually a
“generalized benefit to the collective not typically viewed as producing any
substantial, immediate benefit at an individual level.”98  An individual can
rationally conclude that “if others engage in the behavior necessary to
achieve the collective good she can free ride on their efforts and still gain the
benefits of their behavior.”99  Alternatively, the same rational individual can
just as easily reason “that if she behaves in a manner consistent with the
collective good, her behavior will be meaningless unless other members of
the group also participate.”100  Thus, when many individuals cause a harm
that is external to them, like non-localized air pollution, “the utility maxi-
mizing individual will prefer the harm to cost of avoidance” and see no
reason to change her behavior.101  People must also perceive that the pre-
ferred alternative behavior is economical and convenient102 and that there is
an immediate benefit to them from improved behavior if they are to adhere
to its dictates.103
97 Felicity Barringer, In Many Communities, It’s Not Easy Going Green, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 2008, at A18 (quoting Laura Fiffick, Director of Dallas’s Office of Environmental Quality).
98 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1242; see also id. at 1243 (quoting MANCUR OLSON, THE R
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 50 (2d ed. 1971)
(finding that the larger the group, the harder it is “to solve the problem, particularly given that
‘if one member does or does not help provide the collective good, no other one member will be
significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to react’”)).
99 Id. at 1243; see also Tseming Yang, International Treaty Enforcement as a Public
Good:  Institutional Deterrent Sanctions in International Environmental Agreements, 27
MICH. J INT’L L. 1131, 1157 (2006) (discussing treaty compliance and saying that “[i]terative
processes and long-term interactions alleviate free-rider difficulties,” by “creating  opportuni-
ties for parties to reward cooperators or sanction defectors”); Paul C. Stern et al., A Value-
Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism, 6 HUM.
ECOLOGY REV. 81, 84 (1999) (commenting that “an abiding sense of group fate,” “a belief in
the viability of group action as a strategy,” the inability to distinguish one’s own “capacity to
contribute” from that of other group members, and “sufficiently dense” interpersonal ties
among group members can overcome any free-rider problem (quoting Michael Schwartz &
Paul Shuva, Resource Mobilization Versus the Mobilization of People, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL
MOVEMENT THEORY 205, 214-15 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992))).
100 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1243. R
101 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 588-89. R
102 See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1276 (explaining that, for example, even though road R
congestion is costly, carpooling is not efficient for everyone); see also Dernbach, supra note
20, at 125 (listing, as obstacles to behavior changes toward improved household energy use, R
“money, available technology, convenience, and trust in the information being provided”).
103 Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law:  Expression, Deterrence, and
Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 19 (2000) (stating that “people will tend to make moral
commitments when doing so causes a sufficiently large increase in their opportunities”).  “In-
dividuals who accept a movement’s basic values, believe that valued objects are threatened,
and believe that their actions can help restore those values experience an obligation (personal
norm) for pro-movement action that creates a predisposition to provide support; the particular
type of support that results is dependent on the individual’s capabilities and constraints.”  Stern
et al., supra note 99, at 81. But see Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of Social Norms R
and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REV. 605, 622 (2004) (characterizing Eric Posner as saying
that “[o]ne key to cooperation . . . is that individuals have relatively low discount rates” and
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People have trouble conforming their consumer preferences to their
general support for environmental laws.  Michael Vandenbergh calls this a
“citizen-consumer distinction” and says it “may help explain the disconnect
between citizen support for environmental laws and consumer behavior that
often does not reflect a concern for the environment.”104  An example of this
phenomenon is a “Save the Whales” sticker on the window of an SUV — a
vehicle that excessively consumes fuel, the production of which is threaten-
ing the continued viability of the species the sticker purports to protect.  In-
dividuals in their capacity as citizens may seek results that do not reflect
their market behavior and vice-versa.  Where “individual consumer behavior
is the source of the problem . . . and external sources subject to traditional
regulation are not implicated, policymakers may face a particularly difficult
challenge.”105
People also have trouble restraining themselves, which is at the heart of
any request that they lower their rate of personal consumption.  Self-restraint
does not come easily.106  People may be able to exercise self-restraint on
small matters, like giving up chocolate for Lent, but to accomplish some-
thing as large and challenging as stopping climate change, reaching zero
discharge of pollution, or protecting biodiversity will require a “highly moti-
vated political community to overcome the barriers to self-restraint.”107
Such a community does not yet exist.  Further, a society that rewards self-
interest, such as ours, is unlikely to promote “an ethic of self-restraint.”108
Doremus believes that “convincing people to care [about nature]” is key to
developing individual self-restraint.109  The hope is that if people think of the
nature that they encounter every day “as a special gift that adds value to
their daily lives[,] they will make some sacrifices and accept some limita-
tions to keep it around.”110
that “[p]arties with low discount rates care more about future payoffs and will generally be
willing to invest more in opportunities to cooperate for future benefit”).
104 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 212 n.111. R
105 Id.
106 Lazarus, supra note 22, at 23 (noting that natural selection favored overconsumption R
by individuals because it distinguished oneself from one’s competitors).
107 Doremus, supra note 45, at 351 (referring to the need for concerted political action to R
protect biodiversity).
108 Id. at 351-52 (“Self-restraint implies limits that come from within.  Self-interest,
though, looks entirely to externally-imposed limits, denying the legitimacy of setting limits for
ourselves.”); see Taka´cs-Sa´nta, supra note 4, at 32 (identifying the individualistic characteris- R
tic of Western culture as a reason why Westerners do not feel connected with nature or wild-
life). But see Richard A. Posner, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and Economic Analysis of
Law: A Comment, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 553, 560 (1998) (“I do not myself believe that many
people do things because they think they are the right thing to do unless they have first used
the plasticity of moral reasoning to align the ‘right’ with their self-interest.  I do not think that
knowledge of what is morally right is motivational in any serious sense for anyone except a
handful of saints. . . . [I]n general, you need to appeal to a person’s altruism, fear, or pride
(sometimes moral pride, which is not to be confused with morality) to explain non-self inter-
ested behavior.”).
109 Doremus, supra note 45, at 351; see also id. at 352. R
110 Id. at 353; see also id. at 348 (suggesting building “stronger emotional connections to
ordinary nature” to achieve that goal).
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America’s love affair with cars and the power of the “norm of solo
commuting”111 provide vivid illustrations of how hard it is to change per-
sonal behavior that is firmly grounded in self-interest.  “The solo driver in
his car has become an expression of American individualism, a symbol of
freedom and liberation.”112  As Lior Strahilevitz explains, the solo-commut-
ing norm is reinforced by a popular culture that glorifies “the rugged indi-
vidualist solo driver,”113 the desire for privacy and solitude, and personal
lifestyle choices about where to live and work.114  The norm persists even
though most drivers “understand that society would be better off if they
instead adhered to a carpooling norm.”115  Even while many solo drivers
support increased spending for mass transit programs and the construction of
HOV lanes116 to satisfy the “aspirational norm” that they would “rather be
carpooling,” the strength of their personal desire to drive alone makes them
refuse to abandon their cars in favor of mass transit or carpooling.117  “The
thought of carpooling never occurs to these drivers,”118 even though they can
observe that traffic is moving better in HOV lanes and that all they would
have to do to share in that benefit would be to pick up additional drivers.119
Further, despite increasing awareness of the need to be green and buy fuel
efficient or alternative fuel vehicles, the public has not changed its behavior
when it comes to the type of car it wants.120  As one journalist has observed,
“[n]o matter what vehicles Detroit and its rivals develop, . . . ultimately car
buyers will decide whether the environment wins. [According to Lawrence
D. Burns, General Motors’s Vice President for Research and Development
and Strategic Planning,] ‘[u]nless you get the consumer involved in this
mission, it’s not solvable.’” 121
111 See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1261. R
112 Id. at 1236.
113 Id. at 1240.
114 Id. at 1234 n.11.
115 Id.  Strahilevitz refers to another driving norm, “the carpool missionary norm,” held
by “many environmentalists and carpoolers”:  “carpooling is morally superior to solo driving,
and . . . carpoolers are therefore entitled to receive preferential treatment on the roads in the
form of HOV lanes.” Id. at 1240; see also id. at 1241 (noting that “[t]he people most likely to
enforce these [HOV] norms vigilantly, however, will be adherents to the carpool missionary
norm, who see themselves as the sole intended beneficiaries of the HOV lanes”).
116 Id. at 1240-41.
117 Id. at 1238.  “This somewhat hypocritical stance is partially explained by the fact that
‘most drivers see themselves as victims of congestion, not contributors to it.’” Id. (citation
omitted).  The hypocrisy is “underscored” by the willingness of many solo drives to support
carpooling and mass transit “as a way of inducing other drivers to leave the roads so that the
remaining solo drivers will have quicker commutes.” Id.
118 Id. at 1239.
119 Id.
120 “[T]he most enticing cars at the Washington Auto Show have little to do with alterna-
tive fuels, pollution-reducing technology or . . .  Earth-friendly marketing themes . . . . People
see the Rolls-Royce Phantom, the latest iteration of the mammoth British luxury sedan, and
they exude desire.”  Sholnn Freeman, Longing for Size and Speed: Auto Crowd Eschews
Green, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2008, at D1.
121 Micheline Maynard, Getting to Green, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at H1.
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Finally, it may be hard to figure out what the correct behavior is.122
“Trying to do right by the environment means sorting through the conflict-
ing din.”123  Often there are no simple answers to environmental problems;
even worse, the answers may spawn their own problems.  For example, two
recent studies in the journal Science independently concluded that “[a]lmost
all biofuels used today cause more greenhouse gas emissions than conven-
tional fuels if the full emissions costs of producing these ‘green’ fuels are
taken into account.”124  An individual concerned about global warming can
reasonably conclude that there are no good alternatives to choose from.  Add
to this problem the inertia created by myths, cognitive dissonance, habit, and
other barriers to changing behavior, and it is not difficult to see why people
do not easily abandon their prior “bad” behavior.  With this background, the
Article now turns to the question of whether norms can overcome these bar-
riers and influence people to behave more environmentally responsibly.
IV. THE ROLE OF NORMS IN INFLUENCING BEHAVIOR
Norms are informal obligations125 or social rules that are not dependent
on government either for their creation or their enforcement.126  Norms can
be both descriptive and aspirational, as they portray how people behave and
also prescribe how they should behave to conform to community expecta-
tions.127  This Section begins by distinguishing between social (external) and
personal (internal) norms, and between abstract and concrete norms.128  The
Section then provides an overview of how norms influence behavior.  The
Section goes on to explain that norms can be “internalized (and enforced
through guilt) or . . . may arise without internalization (and be enforced
122 Even when the answer may be clear, there are other hurdles such as cost, political
support for regulatory initiatives, and competing priorities. See Barringer, supra note 97, at R
A14; see also Michael Specter, Big Foot: In Measuring Carbon Emissions, It’s Easy to Con-
fuse Morality with Science, NEW YORKER, Feb. 25, 2008, at 44, 48 (discussing the difficulty of
putting a carbon label on food, quoting Adrian Williams, agricultural researcher at the Natural
Resources Department of Cranfield University, England: “Everyone always wants to make
ethical choices about the food they eat and the things they buy . . . . And they should.  It’s just
what seems obvious often is not.”).
123 Alex Williams, That Buzz in Your Ear May Be Green Noise, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2008, at ST1 (describing the backlash of “‘green noise’ — static caused by urgent, sometimes
vexing or even contradictory information played at too high a volume for too long”).
124 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Studies Call Biofuels a Greenhouse Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2008, at A9 (noting that prominent among those costs is land clearing for the production of
fuel crops and emissions released from refining and transportation).
125 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 200. R
126 Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special
Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999).
127 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1234 n.11. R
128 See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 891; see also Vandenbergh & Steinemann, R
supra note 9, at 1706 (explaining that social norms are “informal obligations that are enforced R
through social sanctions or rewards”; while also informal obligations, personal norms “are
enforced through an internalized sense of duty to act, as well as guilt or related emotions for a
failure to act”).  Both social and personal norms affect “the utility calculus” one makes in
deciding whether to engage in certain antisocial behavior. Id.
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through external non-legal sanctions such as stigma or ostracism).”129  The
Section concludes by describing how norm activation is particularly difficult
when dealing with environmental situations.
Internal (personal) and external (social) norms arise for different rea-
sons.  Personal norms arise from the belief that one has a personal obligation
to act even when others will not reward that action.130  Thus, a personal norm
“may arise when an individual internalizes a strategy or pattern of behavior
as an obligation,”131 or as a result of repeated personal contacts with an indi-
vidual’s family, friends, schools, or religious organizations.132  Giving money
to charities, tipping at restaurants where you have no expectation of re-
turning, and saying thank you are examples of personal norms that most
people have.133  In turn, these personal interactions become “reciprocal ex-
pectation[s],” endowing them “with a constraining or even an obligatory
character” and making their appearance more unintentional than planned.134
Guilt, anxiety, and loss of self-esteem are the principal reasons people con-
form to internal norms.135
External or social norms like voting or giving blood, on the other hand,
reflect “widely held beliefs about social obligations with respect to which
noncompliance may trigger external social sanctions.”136  Social norms, be-
cause they embody general expectations about public behavior, are respon-
129 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 200.  Social norms are R
nonlegal rules or obligations that certain individuals feel compelled to follow despite
the lack of formal legal sanctions, whether because defiance would subject them to
sanction by others (typically in the form of disapproval, lowered esteem, or even
ostracism) or because they would feel guilty for failing to conform to the norm (a so-
called internalized norm). . . .  In rational actor terms, violating a social norm im-
poses a cost on the violator that can tip the cost-benefit balance in favor of conform-
ity with the norm.
Carlson, supra note 95, at 1238-39. R
130 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 596. R
131 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 69. R
132 “[I]nternational legal norms, values, and beliefs can be internalized through repeated
interaction, sustained discourse, and efforts to persuade governmental and nongovernmental
actions.  In essence, states can be ‘socialized’ into accepting the values and norms of the inter-
national legal system just as children are socialized into accepting a society’s values and norms
through educational and other social processes.”  Yang, supra note 99, at 1147; see also Toni R
M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1889, 1936
(1991) (stressing the importance of family and communal bonds and saying that “informal
nongovernment institutions [should] first reconstitute a consensus about moral behavior and
next establish mechanisms for effective negative and positive reinforcement of behavior.  De-
centralization of authority, revitalization of family bonds and communal bonds, and a more
robust sense of interdependence and responsibility to others thus should precede, or at least
accompany, any legislative or judicial attempt to shame people into norm observation.”).
133 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 69.  Vandenbergh goes on to note that these personal R
norms may be useful “in explaining activities . . . that may otherwise be inexplicable from a
narrow view of a rational individual attempting to maximize utility.” Id.
134 Karp, supra note 91, at 313 (quoting DENNIS WRONG, THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 48 R
(1994)).
135 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 68-69. R
136 Id. at 69.
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sive to more external forms of enforcement like gossip, shaming, and even
exclusion from the community.137  Vandenbergh notes that it is “relatively
easy” to enforce social norms because “the transaction costs of inflicting
negative gossip or expressions of esteem may be very low.”138  “The posi-
tive rewards of [personal] norms include pride and increased self-esteem
. . . . [The] rewards of [social] norms include enhanced reputation or the
esteem of others.”139  For both types of norms, what is “appropriate behav-
ior,” the behavior that generates a norm, is formed by the individual’s com-
munity or society as a whole.140  “We recognize norm breaking behavior
because it generates disapproval or stigma, and norm conforming behavior
either because it produces praise, or, in the case of a highly internalized
norm, it is so taken for granted that it provides no reaction whatsoever.”141
There are general, widely held abstract norms, such as the environmen-
tal protection norm, which can be either social or personal.142  Another ab-
stract norm that can reinforce the environmental protection norm is the
“norm of law compliance.”143  One of the things that motivates people to be
law-abiding is “internalization of legal norms or moral commitment to com-
ply with the law.”144  In this sense, a personal abstract norm becomes a
moral inhibition, often reinforced by a sense of personal shame when the
prohibited act is actually engaged in.145  In addition, there is the abstract
“personal responsibility norm,” summarized in the euphemism “do no harm
137 Id. at 70.
138 Id. at 70.  But see Carlson, supra note 95, at 1235 (stating that while social norms may R
develop to “resolve collective action problems among small, economically interdependent
groups,” they are “less likely to develop within large groups,” and attributing this problem to
“large numbers of people, little economic incentive to act, and lack of homogeneity”).
139 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 70; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Norm Enforcement in R
the Public Sphere: The Case of Handicapped Parking, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 895, 908
(2003) (saying that “obvious benefits that flow from complying with a social norm include
“reducing personally offensive conduct, gaining esteem or trust from others, and experiencing
satisfaction from an internalized norm”).
140 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 891-92 (arguing that “[w]e only know what is R
appropriate by reference to the judgments of a community or a society”).
141 Id. at 892.
142 See Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 58 (identifying eight abstract norms: “law compli- R
ance, human health protection, environmental protection, autonomy, fair process, good faith,
reciprocity and conformity”).
143 See generally id. at 81-88.  Vandenbergh identifies the norm of “fair process” as one in
which “[a]n individual should not be treated arbitrarily or be denied an opportunity to defend
her behavior” and demonstrates that if the norm of fair process is violated it can lessen “the
strength of one’s adherence to the norm of law compliance.” Id. at 103.
144 Id. at 68 (listing the other motivating factors as “fear of formal legal sanctions . . .
[and] of informal social sanctions . . . .”).
145 Id. at 130 n.266 (citing Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and
Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 549, 571 (1996)); see also Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 892 (stating that “we R
typically do not consider a rule of conduct to be a social norm unless a shared moral assess-
ment is attached to its observance or non-observance” (quoting James Fearon, What is Identity
(as We Now Use the Word)? 25 n.18 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Univer-
sity of Chicago))).
\\server05\productn\H\HLE\33-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 21 10-FEB-09 12:54
2009] Babcock, New Environmental Norm 137
to others,” which Vandenbergh argues, when activated, can be linked to
global warming and can change individual carbon-emitting actions.146
There are also “concrete norms.”  These can be either social or per-
sonal norms, but they are more specific than abstract norms and supplement
or support the abstract norm.  An example of a concrete environmental norm
that supports the abstract environmental protection norm is water or energy
conservation.147
Because norms exist independent from government, they can “provide
a private, decentralized, and competitive alternative to government control
of social behavior.”148  However, Carlson counsels that norms are best relied
on for this purpose when social problems arise in small, homogeneous
groups of individuals who experience some personal benefit from complying
with the norm and where there are no viable regulatory tools to address the
problem.149  And while norms may be relatively inexpensive and efficient
ways to encourage positive individual behavior through “social surveillance
and sanctioning,”150 using norms as a basis for regulations may lead to
“over- or under-regulation” to the extent that the norm is premised on some
group identity irrational preference.151  Nonetheless, “[n]orms are particu-
larly effective devices for social control, relative to law, when individual
violations (though perhaps not aggregate violations) are too trivial, or the
difficulty of proving guilt too great,” to warrant government enforcement.152
Norms play a significant part in directing individual behavior.153  There are
many different reasons why this happens.  According to Robert Cooter, for a
social norm to influence individual behavior, it must be internalized by a
146 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1678. R
147 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1119-20, see also Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra R
note 9, at 1706 (defining abstract norms, more commonly thought of as values, as “internal- R
ized, personal norms” and stating that concrete norms, while also internalized, are more likely
to be broader social norms, adhered to because of some anticipated social sanction or reward,
and less likely to be followed because they have been internalized).
148 Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 382; see also Geisinger, supra note 103, at 609 R
(noting the value of norms “as a private alternative to law”); Saul Levmore, Norms and Sup-
plements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1989 (2000).
149 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1233-34 (warning that the utility of norms by themselves as R
a substitute for regulation is limited depending on “the nature of the social problem, the con-
text in which it arises, and the availability of other regulatory tools”).
150 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 641-42; see also Levmore, supra note 148, at 2002 (not- R
ing that “the point of social norms is that expected extralegal sanctions or reactions are better
known or better constructed than these direct signs from lawmakers and law enforcers”).
151 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 646. R
152 Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 380; see also Levmore, supra note 148, at R
2018 (noting that “the ‘norms police’ [help to enforce laws by giving] disapproving looks in
the event of violations”).  But see Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1113 n.51 (arguing that “‘no R
well-developed theory of guilt allows us to make predictions about when’ it will be influential
or ‘what kinds of people feel guilt and what kinds of people do not’” (citing ERIC A. POSNER,
LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 43 (2000))).
153 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 596; see also Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, R
at 1709 (referencing various studies examining how “abstract norms favoring environmental
protection [and] beliefs about energy use” relate to energy conservation behaviors).
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large part of the individual’s relevant community.154  This happens through a
process of the community reaching a consensus about the desirability of par-
ticular behavior.155  This consensus then forms “a baseline level of expecta-
tion,” to which individuals then unthinkingly conform, like saying thank you
when someone does something nice for you.156  People do not question
whether particular behavior is good or bad because they have internalized
the norm.  To Miller, social norms work precisely because people internalize
them “within their own psychic structures.”157  It is this feature that makes
an internalized norm powerful because conforming to the norm is not at
issue.158  Motivators of personal behavior like guilt, lack of self-esteem, or
community sanction come into play, and the norm is enforced.
Eric Posner finds internalization of social norms unnecessary because
of the phenomenon of “signaling.”159  Behavior change, he says, will occur
when signaling by others of their intention to cooperate in some behavior is
sufficiently commonplace.160  Alex Geisinger agrees that internalization of
norms is not important for them to be effective, but he believes that sanc-
tions for norm violations that exceed the cost of complying with it are criti-
cal to maintaining the norm.161
Paul Stern, who thinks that personal norms can direct the choices indi-
viduals make, says that “[p]ersonal norms . . . are activated when an indi-
vidual believes that violating them would have adverse effects on things the
individual values . . . [when, b]y taking action, he or she would bear signifi-
cant responsibility for the consequences,” and when “contextual influ-
ences,” like available technology, legal, and regulatory requirements,
convenience, and social expectations, are weak.162  Thus, for a personal ab-
stract norm (environmental protection) or concrete norm (turn off the lights
or take the bus) to be activated, a person must both understand how her
action will affect the environment and be willing to “take personal responsi-
154 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy:  The Struc-
tural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1665
(1996). But see Carlson, supra note 95, at 1240 (stating that “internalization is not necessary R
because people react to and desire the esteem of others, whether or not they believe in the
correctness of a norm” (discussing Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Reg-
ulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 358 (1997))).
155 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1280; see also Geisinger, supra note 103, at 621. R
156 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1280. R
157 Miller, supra note 139, at 898. R
158 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 913. R
159 See POSNER, supra note 152, at 18-27. R
160 See also Posner, supra note 108, at 554 (citing as examples of signaling theory “salut- R
ing the flag or denouncing Bosnians, in order to signal loyalty to the group with which one has
their most valuable interactions or, more broadly, in order to establish a network”).
161 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 608-609. R
162 Paul C. Stern, Understanding Individuals’ Environmentally Significant Behavior, 35
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,787-88 (2005); see also Stern et al., supra note 99, at 83 R
(finding that “norm-based actions flow from three factors: acceptance of particular personal
values, beliefs that things important to those values are under threat, and beliefs that actions
initiated by the individual can help alleviate the threat and restore the values”).
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bility for causing . . . those consequences.”163  In other words, if people do
not think that the effects of their behavior are significant, “concrete norms
linked to the environmental protection and reciprocity norms will not be
activated and little pro-environmental behavior will occur.”164  Therefore,
providing information tying individual behavior (turning off lights) to envi-
ronmental harm (air pollution) appears to be an essential part of activating
concrete environmental norms (like energy conservation).165
Unless barriers to responsible environmental behavior arise, such as
those discussed in Section III,166 when a concrete personal norm is activated,
a person will feel an obligation to behave in a particular way.167  When a
social norm is triggered, the individual feels guilty if she violates it and her
behavior runs counter to the social pressure to conform to its dictates.  She
may even feel a sense of duty to conform her behavior to the norm.  Addi-
tionally, if she believes that others in her immediate community or the gov-
ernment will enforce the norm, or she develops greater confidence in
information that identifies her behavior as bad for the environment, then the
influence of external social pressure may increase the likelihood that she will
act consistently with it.168  As the perceived social pressure on the individual
to engage in certain behavior increases, and it becomes easier for her to
engage in the new behavior, her attitude toward the new behavior naturally
becomes more favorable.169
163 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1120; see also Corporate Social Responsibility; R
Designing a Sustainable Future, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2007, at ZJ1 (describing Yahoo’s “18
Seconds” campaign and saying it is designed “to provide a tool that is often missing — the
ability to see how one persons simple act, like changing a light bulb, can combine with mil-
lions of other small acts to create massive change” (quoting Andy Ruben, Vice President of
Strategy and Sustainability, Wal-Mart)).
164 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1129; see also id. at 1126 (saying that the environmental R
protection norm will not be activated if a person believes that she did not cause the environ-
mental problem); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1710 (finding people were R
willing to conserve energy when they learned that the aggregate actions of people caused
environmental harm and that collective response by the group “could make a big difference”
and help people generally (quoting NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY USE:  THE HUMAN
DIMENSION 39, 72 (Paul C. Stern & Elliott Aronson eds., 1984))).
165 See Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 97; see also Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra R
note 9, at 1712 (recommending the use of the widespread abstract norm of personal responsi- R
bility connected to concrete norms favoring carbon-emissions reductions); Stern, supra note
162, at 10,787-88. R
166 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1121-22 (noting that “[t]hese constraints, ranging R
from the financial costs of behavior change (e.g., purchasing a less polluting car), to the physi-
cal effort required for the behavior (e.g., walking to a bus stop), to the social costs (e.g., the
inability to signal social status with a large, high-polluting vehicle), in many cases will be
substantial”); see also Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 77 n.64 (citing Icek Ajzen, From Inten- R
tions to Actions: A Theory of Planned Behavior, in ACTION CONTROL: FROM COGNITION TO
BEHAVIOR 11 (Julius Kuhl & Ju¨rgen Beckmann eds., 1985)).
167 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1121. R
168 Id. at 1120-21.
169 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 77 n.64 (citing Ajzen, supra note 166, at 11). R
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Although complying with a norm can impose direct and opportunity
costs, be inconvenient, and require effort,170 compliant behavior also has in-
strumental value, such as obtaining praise, esteem, promotion, and preferen-
tial dealings.171  One reason the government gives awards is to “induce
people to internalize values” by “rewarding citizens for having civic vir-
tue,” or sanctioning them when they behave badly.172  Complying with a
norm also allows a person to avoid social sanction, which can be unpleas-
ant.173  The positive features of norm compliance lead people who have inter-
nalized a norm to be “willing to sacrifice something to obey it.”174
However, there are circumstances in which norm activation is very dif-
ficult, and many of these arise in environmental situations.  For example, as
discussed previously, when second generation environmental harms are at
issue, it is extremely difficult “to conceptualize individual behavior as a dis-
tinct source of social problems.”175  This conceptualization failure can im-
pede the development of a personal norm, directing an individual to act in a
way that will decrease her contribution to the harm, let alone conform her
behavior to an existing social norm.  Further, to the extent norms are created
and sustained by social sanctions,176 it is difficult to use these sanctions in
negative payoff, close-knit situations.177  In those circumstances, “[s]ocial
sanctions will not change the individual payoff because the individual will
either act in isolation or in a setting with insufficient iterative relationships
170 Cooter, supra note 103, at 7-8 (using the example that “20% of the population may be R
unwilling to endure unpleasantness to clean up after their dogs unless they gain an offsetting
advantage”); see also id. at 6.
171 Carlson notes that “[t]o the extent that garnering neighbors’ esteem or signaling one’s
reputation motivates a potential recycler, visible curbside recycling is a wonderful tool. . . .
Those who do not recycle are visible noncooperators.”  Carlson, supra note 95, at 1279. R
172 Cooter, supra note 103, at 19; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 104; Specter, R
supra note 122, at 53 (quoting Richard Sandor, Chairman and C.E.O of the Chicago Climate R
Exchange, as favoring incentives over punishment because punishing people “for being bad
corporate citizens” is a matter of going “to your local church or synagogue and tell[ing] God
to punish them” and is not the problem of the Chicago Climate Exchange. But see Cooter,
supra note 103, at 19-20 (questioning whether governments can effectively “reward people for R
having civic virtue” because of the problem of inferring character from individual behavior
when the state lacks “intimate knowledge of the person”); Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1135 R
(questioning the practicality of, among other things, “financial incentive and other schemes
targeted at individuals”).
173 See Cooter, supra note 103, at 8; see also id. (finding that “[g]roup pressures often R
lower the relative cost of popular acts”); Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1265-66 (commenting R
that when enforcement effectively singles out violators, it causes a shift in norms from non-
compliance to compliance and results in greater compliance as people seek to avoid penalties
for violating the law).
174 Cooter, supra note 103, at 6. R
175 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1164. R
176 See id. at 1101 (stating that “[o]ne of the greatest problems facing norms theorists and
regulators is how to induce individuals to act who will not benefit personally and who are not
subject to legal or social sanctions”).
177 Id. at 1102 (“[I]n an increasingly crowded society, individuals face numerous situa-
tions in which acting in their personal interest will harm the collective interest, but their large
numbers undermine the influence of legal and social sanctions.”).  For further discussion of
sanctions, see Section VI, infra.
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or information exchange [with others] to enable social norm sanctioning to
occur.”178  For example, the fact that most driving usually “occurs on high-
ways and in other classic loose-knit group situations,” makes it extremely
difficult to use social sanctions to discourage individual drivers from ille-
gally using HOV lanes, or from throwing trash out their car windows.179  In
such situations, using norms to control or eliminate negative behavior is un-
likely to succeed without government intervention, but that will not happen
unless the norms themselves change, setting up a classic catch-22
situation.180
This is why Ann Carlson says that while norms may “generate an initial
burst of cooperative efforts,” without help they may not lead to behavior
change.181  She sees the effectiveness of norms as tied to the amount of per-
sonal effort required to conform to them and how often the desired behavior
must be engaged in.  Although the intensity of an individual’s adherence to a
social norm is a predictor of her willingness to undertake behavior that re-
quires effort on her part, Carlson says reducing the effort required will have
a greater effect on behavior over time than strengthening social norms.182
This conclusion is borne out by her empirical data demonstrating that mak-
ing it easy and convenient to recycle is more important than a concrete social
norm favoring recycling, and that these factors may actually lessen the
strength of social norms.183
Nonetheless, Carlson concedes that commitment to a norm is important
for individual environmental action involving “large-number, small-payoff
collective action problems” that also require a high level of effort, like tak-
ing recycling to a drop-off center.184  Even in situations where “an individual
externalizes the harm caused by her behavior” — making it likely that the
costs, either in money or in personal effort, of changing her behavior will
exceed any benefit she might receive185 — her participation in that behavior
178 Id. at 1105.
179 Id. at 1112.
180 See id. at 1105-06.
181 See Carlson, supra note 95, at 1259. R
182 Id. at 1236; see also Monroe, supra note 49, at 115 (suggesting in addition that peer R
pressure, public visibility, frequency, testability and feedback can inspire responsible environ-
mental behavior).
183 See Carlson, supra note 95, at 1236 (“In fact, increasing convenience is so effective R
that individual commitment toward the desired behavior bears little relationship to whether
someone will engage in it.”); see also id. at 1295-96; id. at 1280 (noting that while
“[c]onvenience . . . seems to be the most important motivator, . . . [t]here is some evidence
. . . that signaling or esteem-gathering may matter in the promotion of recycling behavior”).
184 Id. at 1296. But see id. at 1250 (pointing out “where the payoff is an environmental
benefit (clean air, clean water, preservation of natural resources), the benefit may seem less
tangible than direct economic gain,” making it less likely that people will cooperate in enforc-
ing norms); Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1105 (asking the question “whether norms also
have a meaningful influence when the payoff to the individual is negative and the behavior
does not occur in a close-knit group”).
185 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1105 (commenting that individual behavior in negative R
pay-off, loose-knit group situations presents challenges to norms theorists and regulators).
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will likely be greater if she has strong beliefs in the rectitude of the social
norm.186  For example, in the case of an environmental benefit like clean air
or clean water, where the personal benefit appears less “tangible” than the
direct benefit from behaving in an environmentally irresponsible manner, a
social norm supporting behavior that benefits the general public interest in a
clean environment may encourage people to behave cooperatively in further-
ance of the norm.187  In other words, people “may need to believe indepen-
dently that they should recycle, or donate blood, or vote, or turn out the
lights when they leave a room.”188  When there is no monetary benefit from
the changed behavior, people may also need additional incentives to con-
form to a norm’s dictates, such as intervention from the government or other
organizations.189  Martha Monroe notes, however, that outside incentives will
only work when “they kick-start a behavior that continues for other reasons”
so that when incentives are withdrawn, the good behavior continues because
the individual ascribes the behavioral change “to a change in herself.”190
Thus, norms can play a role in influencing individual behavior under
the right circumstances.  More specifically, if there is some communal con-
sensus about the validity of the norm, and people also believe that actions
inconsistent with the norm might harm others or harm something of value to
them, then a sense of obligation to comply with the norm may arise.  It also
helps if people understand the connection between their action and the re-
sulting harm.  This obligation to conform personal behavior to some com-
munally accepted norm exists independently of government directions
telling people how to behave and is reinforced by other abstract norms, such
as the personal responsibility norm.
186 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1296. R
187 Id. at 1250; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 588-89 (saying that in cases where R
multiple individuals cause an external harm even if some of them would support reducing the
environmentally harmful behavior, “collective action problems may prevent the individuals
from organizing to enforce the limits on behavior”).
188 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1250. But see Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at R
1710 (reporting on studies that found a “sense of moral obligation” to have a greater effect on
behavior than the cost or price of a product or service).
189 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1250. But see Shuman, supra note 74, at 159 (saying incen- R
tives like attorney and expert witness fees and small damage awards might encourage people
to litigate injury cases involving small damage claims); Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, R
at 372 (saying that sanctions cannot be too severe, or people will not engage in what might be
otherwise efficient action, nor can they be too costly to administer, which will depend on how
often the norm is violated).
190 Monroe, supra note 49, at 119.  Monroe also notes that internal incentives like “frugal- R
ity” and “community participation” may help people not only undertake some positive envi-
ronmental behavior, but also sustain it. Id. at 119-20.
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V. HOW A NEW NORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY MIGHT
ARISE AND DISPLACE OTHER NORMS
Changing the existing abstract norm of environmental protection and
creating a new norm are each difficult and lengthy processes.  This Section
begins by explaining that for a new norm to develop, a new social meaning
must be created.  Then the Section sets out arguments from scholars who
both support and oppose a role for the government and suggest other entities
that could play that role.  The Section ends by describing the unique
problems with the environmental protection norm that may explain why peo-
ple are hesitant to adhere to it.
Changing any norm is difficult to the extent that it requires the aban-
donment of preconceived ideas.  Here, the idea that must be abandoned is
that industry is responsible for environmental harm.  This idea shields the
individual from any responsibility for the harm.  Indeed, a social norm may
have been formed excusing some types of irresponsible personal behavior.191
Therefore, in creating a norm of individual environmental responsibility, so-
ciety will have to overcome the appeal of blaming someone else for the
problem.  This will require substantial effort, perhaps including external
prodding.
Social meaning can “shape social norms” by strengthening or modify-
ing existing norms or by encouraging or impeding the emergence of new
norms.192  Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink describe the “life cycle”
of norms and identify the point at which a new social meaning, what they
call “agreements” or “shared moral assessments,” emerges.193  They say
norms have three stages, “norm emergence,” “broad norm acceptance,” and
norm “internalization,” with a “threshold or ‘tipping point’” dividing the
first two stages.194  A “tipping point” occurs when “a critical mass” of other
actors “become norm leaders and adopt new norms.”195  What constitutes a
critical mass is a sufficient number of people who agree with the new norm
to create an impression of broad-based adoption.  Included among those peo-
ple must be individuals with moral suasion or who are essential to achieving
the norm’s goals.196  One feature contributing to norm internalization at the
end of stage two is repeated behavior and habit.  Internalization of a new
norm also depends upon the type of norm involved and the “prominence” of
191 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 216. R
192 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 204. R
193 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 892.  Although writing about the phenomenon R
of international norm dynamics, the authors note parallels to norm dynamics at the domestic
level. See id. at 893 (discussing the domestic emergence of the norm of women’s suffrage).
194 Id. at 895.
195 Id. at 901.
196 Cf. id. at 901 (arguing that a critical mass often is reached when “one-third of the total
states in the system adopt the norm,” understanding that not all states have equal “normative
weight,” and the states that have adopted the norm “are critical to” achieving the “substantive
norm goal” or “have a certain moral stature”).
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the norm leaders.197  Thus, norms that are clear and sufficiently specific so
people know how to behave are more likely to be internalized and, therefore,
to change behavior.198 Similarly, norms that make “universalistic” claims
about what is good for a lot of people, and that are consistent with “existing
normative frameworks” also have a higher likelihood of success.199  This last
factor requires norm leaders to construct “linkages” between norms that are
more established and those that are emerging.200
To Cass Sunstein, “norm entrepreneurs,”201 those individuals whose
mission is to change social norms, are critical to the emergence of a new
norm and to its adoption by others — what Finnemore and Sikkink call
“socialization.”202  Norm entrepreneurs203 shine a spotlight on issues or even
create new issues “by using language that names, interprets and dramatizes
them.”204  They construct “cognitive frames” and, if they succeed in this
effort, “the new frames resonate with broader public understandings and are
adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.”205  One
way norm entrepreneurs do this is through “strategic social construction,” or
“persuasion,”206 a process by which they try to change how other actors
“maximize their utilities” so that their utility calculus is changed to conform
to the norm entrepreneurs’ normative commitments.207  Indeed, persuasion is
“the mission of norm entrepreneurs.”208
However, this process of assisting in the emergence of a new norm is
not easy, as norm entrepreneurs must deal with “firmly embedded alterna-
tive norms and frames that create alternative perceptions of both appropri-
ateness and interest.”209  In order to make a new norm emerge where the
appropriateness of prior norms is being contested, norm entrepreneurs may
197 Id. at 906-07.
198 Id. at 907-08.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 908.
201 For Sunstein’s definition of norm entrepreneurs, see supra note 7; see also Geoffrey P. R
Miller, Norms and Interests, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 637, 639 (2003) (describing norm entrepre-
neurs as “self-appointed champions of particular values or rules for behavior”).
202 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 902 (explaining that “the primary mechanism R
for promoting norm cascades is . . . socialization,” which occurs through a process of “emula-
tion, . . . praise (for behavior that conforms to group norms), and ridicule (for deviation)” and
noting in addition that socialization can occur through state or non-state action, such as net-
works of norm entrepreneurs (citing KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
75-76 (1979))).
203 See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 897. R
204 Id.; see also Babcock, supra note 6 (saying that environmental groups are ideal norm R
entrepreneurs and have a critical role in inducing a norm of individual environmental responsi-
bility in the wake of the climate change crisis).
205 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 897. R
206 See id. at 914 (defining term as “the process by which agent action becomes social
structure, ideas become norms”).
207 Id. at 910.
208 Id. at 914.
209 Id. at 897.
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use inappropriate persuasive tools, which may lead to their ostracism.210
Norm entrepreneurs also may need government endorsement of their new
norms and agreement to include norm socialization as part of their agenda
because by themselves they lack the ability to compel adoption of the new
norm.211
When a norm entrepreneur succeeds at changing what had been ac-
cepted behavior, “the results can be a rapid, self-perpetuating change in so-
cial practice — a ‘cascade’ or ‘bandwagon’ effect as many people abandon
the old norm and come to behave in conformity with a new one.”212  Norm
cascades are assisted by a form of “peer pressure” motivated by a desire for
“legitimation, conformity, and self esteem.”213  The cascade is set off by a
change in majority preferences,214 in large part brought on by the work of
norm entrepreneurs.  Once a cascade occurs, there is no longer any need for
outside pressure from norm entrepreneurs to adopt the norm.215
Social meaning shapes norms especially when that meaning is articu-
lated by some law.216  “[L]aw is expressive in the sense that it can signal,
reinforce or change social meaning,” and “the public can receive a message
conveyed by law, whether intended or unintended, and . . . this message can
have an impact on perceptions about the sources of a problem and on the
210 Id.  What motivates norm entrepreneurs to go forward given these costs is a mix of
empathy, altruism, and commitment to “the ideals and values embedded in the norms,” even
at some personal cost. Id.
211 Id. at 900.
212 Miller, supra note 201, at 639 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social R
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996)); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1281 n.259 R
(“[G]roups may adhere to conflicting norms, and . . . a sudden shift by a few important
individuals can cause a cascade of others to follow suit, thereby altering the dominant norm.”
(citing Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1264 (1999))); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1709; id. at 1712 (predicting the R
tying of the widespread personal responsibility norm to the concrete norm of carbon neutrality
will lead to “cascades in behavior as individuals perceive that the personal norms of a few
have become widespread social norms”).  Similar cascades occur in nature. See Hope M.
Babcock, Administering the Clean Water Act:  Do Regulators Really Have “Bigger Fish to
Fry” When It Comes to Addressing the Practice of Chumming on the Chesapeake Bay?, 21
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2007) (discussing cascades in estuarine ecosystems).
213 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 895.  Although discussed in the context of R
what motivates nation-states at the international level to adopt new norms, the concepts of
legitimation (approval by other members of one’s community), conformity (a sense of belong-
ing to a larger community), and esteem (the desire to have others think well of you) seem
equally apt when applied to individual behavior.  To the extent identity is based on personal
qualities “in which an individual has special pride or from which an individual gains self
esteem . . . [,] the desire to gain or defend one’s pride or self esteem can explain norm follow-
ing.” Id.; see Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 112 (describing the “conformity norm”). R
214 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 641 (“Moreover, while norms are relatively stable, such a R
view allows for change in norms when a change in majority preference occurs because of the
creation of new information.”).
215 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 902 (finding that a positive response to a norm R
cascade is not without costs to conforming individuals as they change their behavior any more
than it is costless for norm entrepreneurs to urge the implementation of new norms).
216 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 204; see also Stern, supra note 162, at 10,788 (sug- R
gesting that “if one adopts a long-time perspective, it may be that personal norms can perco-
late up through society and become legally codified social norms”).
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social norms that develop in response to those perceptions.”217  Law can in-
fluence perceptions of the acceptability of certain behavior at a very personal
level by shifting the utility calculus.  For example, a law that requires the use
of seat belts as a means of saving lives both informs people about the risks
of driving without a seat belt and creates a perception of wide public accept-
ance of the behavior.218  In this way, law can affect what people think about
the nature of a problem and the extent of public support for addressing it, the
effect of which is that people will take both the law and the problem “more
seriously.”219  The law communicates “whose interests it values” and how
seriously it values those interests by its selection of the type of conduct pun-
ished, the sanctions used, and their severity.220  Thus, environmental laws
directly express social meaning when they prohibit or sanction certain con-
duct and can change the social meaning of conduct that previously might not
have been condemned.221  The problem is that law has sent the wrong mes-
sage about individual responsibility for environmental harm, and that mes-
sage is unlikely to self-correct.
Therefore, a new social meaning about responsibility for environmental
harm must be created for a new environmental protection norm to emerge.222
Since norms are public goods223 and as such constitute a form of social
meaning about the desirability or undesirability of certain action, then
changing a norm or creating a new one requires some form of public action
and public sanction for its violation.224  This does not necessarily mean that
there must be formal public action through the executive or legislative
branches, which is unlikely in the case of regulating individual behavior,225
217 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 201-02; see also id. at 199-200. R
218 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1707 (explaining how laws shift R
beliefs connecting concrete and abstract norms); see also Dernbach, supra note 20, at 133 (“A R
law addressing a particular problem validates the existence of that problem and indicates the
existence of sufficient consensus to address it.”); McAdams, supra note 154, at 346-47. R
219 Dernbach, supra note 20, at 133. R
220 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 202. R
221 Id. at 203.
222 Id. at 200 (“[S]ocial meaning . . . [is] ‘the frameworks of understanding in which
individuals live.” (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning and Deterrence,
83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997))); see also id. at 214 n.115 (quoting Lawrence Lessig, The Regula-
tion of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1022 (1995)) (saying social meanings are
“collective goods,” requiring “collective action” to change them); Vandenbergh, supra note
10, at 200 (“[R]egulation of social meaning . . . include[s] ‘all the ways in which the law R
creates and shapes information about the kinds of behavior that members of the public hope
for and value, as well as the kinds they expect and fear.’”).
223 See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 370; see also id. at 377 (saying that be- R
cause a norm is a public good it is “in danger of being underproduced”).  Posner and Ras-
musen also note that a norm is “nonrivalrous, because its cost does not rise if more people use
the norm; and it is nonexcludable, because people who do not contribute to its enforcement
cannot be denied its benefits.” Id. at 377.
224 Id. at 377; see also Yang, supra note 99, at 1168 (discussing this same problem at the R
international level with respect to enforcing treaties).
225 See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1135 (noting that “policymakers generally lack R
the political support to pursue expensive infrastructure, financial incentive and other schemes
targeted at individuals,” making otherwise theoretically appealing initiatives practically infea-
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but that the new or amended norm must be adopted and widely supported by
the public, and some form of informal sanctions of sufficient consistency
and severity must be available as a means of recognizing and enforcing it.
However, it can be hard to judge whether norm change has occurred.226
For one, at the end of a norm cascade, “norms may become so widely ac-
cepted that they are internalized by actors and achieve a ‘taken-for-granted
quality,’ making conformance with the norm almost automatic.”227  There is
no discoverable record of discussion among actors about whether they
should conform to the new norm, which might show that a change has oc-
curred.228  Additionally, it may be difficult to move smoothly from an ex-
isting norm to a new or modified one, and if the transition happens too
quickly, existing norms can disappear before “the normative system” can
adapt fully,229 creating a norm gap.  Therefore, there might be a risk that in
the transition from a general abstract environmental protection norm that
focuses on industry to a norm of personal environmental responsibility, the
more abstract norm might temporarily or even completely disappear as peo-
ple substitute themselves for the traditional sources of environmental harm.
Assuming norms require the presence of an outside force to appear or
change, where that force should come from is subject to many different
opinions.  Some scholars think the government has a pivotal role to play in
creating and changing social and individual norms through “public programs
and social understandings” to the extent that those programs “express and
embody norms, and therefore ‘consecrat[e] certain values.’” 230  Carlson sug-
gests that the government might encourage positive behavior indirectly and
inculcate norms of legal compliance by increasing the effort involved in be-
having badly.231  Strahilevitz proposes the government should “splinter”
those who adhere to minority norms off for separate treatment.232
sible, and that “[c]oercive legal requirements are often at least as unpopular”). But see
Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 216-17 (suggesting the enactment of legislation as a way to R
“signal a greater emphasis on individual or other second generation source responsibility for
environmental problems”)
226 See Yang, supra note 99, at 1148 (“Norm internalization and transformation usually do R
not result in easily discernable changes or quantifiable progress.”).
227 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 65, at 904; see also id. at 913 (“[M]any norms, R
including some of the most powerful ones, have been so internalized that we no long [sic]
think seriously about alternative behavior.”).
228 Id. at 895.
229 See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 378. R
230 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 202 n.66 (characterizing Richard H. Pildes, The New R
Public Law: The Unintended Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium,
89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 940-42 (1991)) (alteration in original); see also Dernbach, supra note
20, at 158 (suggesting that EPA be given the job of finding better ways to inform individuals of
the greenhouse gas effects of their actions and “to develop and recommend more effective
incentives”); Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 91 (“[B]y collecting, analyzing and reporting R
data that link particular violations to particular human health harms, enforcement agencies
may be able to harness internal and external norm-based sanctions . . . .”).
231 See Carlson, supra note 95, at 1296. R
232 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1282; see also Carlson, supra note 95, at 1298 (noting any R
government intervention in large-number, small-payoff collective action problems must take
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The government can also “change the ‘social meaning’ of certain be-
haviors by using law expressively to change norms,”233  for example, by
recasting an action that was previously considered to be a matter of individ-
ual choice with only individual consequences into one that creates negative
externalities.234  Government-led information campaigns, shaming people
into feeling guilty about their behavior, using celebrities to support a particu-
lar position, as well as directing or prohibiting certain behavior or using
taxes or subsidies to discourage or encourage it can all change norms and
related behavior.235  Cooter cites the example of no smoking signs in airports
as an instance where announcing a rule “tipped the balance in favor of infor-
mal enforcement by citizens.”236  The mere publication of the rule can create
an expectation that others will comply with it.  As this expectation takes
hold, compliant behavior increases.237
A law by itself can influence the social meaning of actions and can
influence what people think others might do.238  Laws “can be used to publi-
cize a consensus that a particular concrete behavior is necessary in order to
comply with an abstract internalized norm”;239 failure to comport with that
consensus can create a sense of individual guilt.240  Stewart and others talk
about “reflexive law,” the process by which environmental norms are inter-
nalized,241 and how the law can “tie internal, abstract norms (‘be a good
account of the amount of effort required to resolve the problem and the need for repeated,
periodic engagement if long term behavior change is to occur); Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at R
1123 (“[L]egal interventions should seek to change individuals’ awareness of consequences
and acceptance of responsibility related to the environmental protection and reciprocity
norms.”).
233 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 611.  Whitman comments that the government’s use of R
shame sanctions can also change public norms and that government often does use these sanc-
tions to change norms.  James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?,
107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1089 (1998).
234 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1274. R
235 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1252. R
236 Cooter, supra note 103, at 11. R
237 Id. at 21.
238 See id. at 10; see also Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 380 (“But the sanctions R
for violating norms are often too weak to deter all people from many offenses, while norm
creation is too slow to provide for all the rules necessary for the governance of society — so
laws have their place too.”); Lazarus, supra note 22, at 39 (noting that preference changes R
necessary to reduce climate change “are most likely to be driven by law rather than the
converse”).
239 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 613-14; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 75 R
(“[L]aws and enforcement actions may increase an individual decision-maker’s perceptions of
the existence of a consensus regarding a norm . . . [, which] may induce the individual to
internalize the norm.”).
240 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 217-18. R
241 Stewart, supra note 42, at 127 (explaining that reflexive law’s purpose is “to promote R
the internalization of environmental norms by firms and other organizational actors” through
“information disclosure” mechanisms including “product labeling and emissions reporting”
instead of by “directly controlling their external conduct”); see also Vandenbergh, supra note
4, at 1122-23 (describing the “expressive functions of law” by saying “law can change beliefs R
in at least two ways.  First, the enactment of a law can change beliefs about the nature of the
underlying social problem addressed . . . . Second, the enactment of a law can change beliefs
about the existence of a social consensus regarding the problem . . . .”).
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parent’) to concrete norms (‘good parents use child safety seats’), and thus
lead to new behavioral intentions.”242  Laws can also be used to “induce
individuals to believe that the environmental problems caused by their be-
havior are significant . . . , and that if they change behavior these problems
can be ameliorated . . . .”243
When a law supports a social norm, state sanctions can supplement so-
cial sanctions.244  For example, fines can increase the shame from littering or
driving illegally in an HOV lane.  Legal sanctions make “legal expression
more likely to cause a jump in behavior,”245 setting off a norm cascade.246
Conversely, in the absence of government sanctions, a social norm like the
carpooling norm will weaken.247  Thus, law and social norms complement
each other as ways to control individual behavior — “informal social norms
are vague general principles” with inexact sanctions that a law “transforms”
into an unambiguous obligation with an explicit sanction.248  At a minimum,
law has a supplementary role to play “[w]hen social norms fail to control
harmful behavior.”249
Not all scholars agree, however, that the government should play a role
in norm creation.  For example, Stephen Garvey worries that “[a] liberal
state should not concern itself with the moral development of its citizens.
When the state punishes, it should stay away from the ‘inner citadels of the
soul’; its aims should not include ‘bring[ing] about certain responsive atti-
tudes in those whom it condemns.’  Repentance is within the jurisdiction of
the church.”250  According to Garvey, government should “remain neutral
. . . and must not try to coerce its citizens into embracing . . . any particular
vision of the ‘good life.’” 251  Richard Epstein agrees and quotes with ap-
proval John Stuart Mill on the limited role of government in character for-
mation and behavior.252  Thus, to Garvey and Epstein, norms should only
242 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 75; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 218 (say- R
ing that “[r]ecycling requirements, which have been surprisingly well received in many areas,
may already accomplish this function for some household waste problems”).
243 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1123. R
244 See Cooter, supra note 103, at 21-22; id. at 15 (using tax cheating as an example). R
245 Id. at 16.
246 See generally Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67 (saying norms develop according to R
a three-stage life cycle: i) norm emergence; ii) norm cascade; iii) norm internalization).
247 See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1242. R
248 Cooter, supra note 103, at 21; see also Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 380 R
(“Government can provide supplemental punishments if the informal sanction for violating a
norm is inadequate.”); id. (“Legal sanctions for norm violations are also important because
many people are impervious to informal sanctions.”). But see id. at 381 (suggesting that
sometimes the “best policy” is having the government stay out of the way).
249 Cooter, supra note 103, at 22. R
250 Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishment Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 774
(1998).
251 Id. at 772.
252 Richard A. Epstein, Let “The Fundamental Things Apply”:  Necessary and Contingent
Truths in Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1299 n.40 (2002) (“[T]he only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
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arise spontaneously and not as a result of government interference or
coercion.
Even some scholars who concede some role to the government in norm
formation and enhancement see little to gain from governmental interfer-
ence.253  Carlson believes that while governments can strengthen social
norms through publicizing preferred behavior, sanctions, passing laws, and
other methods, “the payoff” from such intervention is significantly less than
making the desired behavior easier to perform.254  Because the government
“is not usually an ingroup source and its messages as an outgroup source
will be discounted,” it cannot effectively play the role of norm entrepreneur
and change social meaning, leaving Geisinger to conclude that it should not
even try.255  Even Cooter, who is otherwise a supporter of law’s expressive
power and precision, praises the flexibility and low transaction costs of so-
cial norms.256
Group theory suggests that government has limited capacity to change
social meaning and that the use of some tools, like shaming, may well con-
strain individuals who are least in need of being restrained.257  “Regulations
that seek to direct personal behavior by fiat are extremely unpopular,”258
even generating “reactance” as people attempt to go around them.259  Such
regulations are also often inefficient and expensive to enforce.260  Thus, if
sustained government intrusion is important to get people to behave in an
environmentally responsible manner, not only may this be difficult for the
government to do, as discussed previously, but government involvement
may generate considerable ill will.261  Further, to the extent norms are en-
forced by guilt and shame, they are particularly resistant to change by gov-
ernmental action because “[g]uilt and shame are heavily influenced by
sufficient warrant.” (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (Ernest Rhys ed., 1910))); see also id. at 1299-1300 (noting
that while it may make sense to try to convince people who prefer beer over milk of the
foolishness of their preference, it is unwise to direct them to do this for their own protection).
253 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1298 (recommending “more intensive persuasive tech- R
niques, such as having workers urge their colleagues to carpool,” instead of government-spon-
sored radio ads urging drivers to carpool); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1241 R
(recommending that transit authorities provide phone numbers that cellular-phone wielding
motorists can call to snitch on solo drivers who use the carpool lanes as a means of counteract-
ing the anonymity of solo driving where freeway drivers are rarely repeat players).
254 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1235-36; see also id. at 1299. R
255 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 652. R
256 Cooter, supra note 103, at 21-22; see also Epstein, supra note 252, at 1304. R
257 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 614. R
258 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103. R
259 Monroe, supra note 49, at 120. R
260 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103. R
261 See Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 214  (discussing how even though people express R
strong support for environmental protection, “[d]eep-seated notions of individual freedom,
open space, and the frontier mentality, as well as concerns about basic needs such as education
and safety, may affect perceptions and norms about many second generation problems”); see
also Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 100 (noting that a European study showed that although R
more intrusive enforcement programs achieved greater compliance than less intrusive pro-
grams, they also generated more ill will).
\\server05\productn\H\HLE\33-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 35 10-FEB-09 12:54
2009] Babcock, New Environmental Norm 151
social conditioning” through families, churches, and schools.262  Thus, the
participation of non-governmental institutions in the norm-changing process
may be necessary.263  However, the government can combat bad norms
through penalties or effective remedies that reduce the benefits of complying
with them.264
If not the government, then who should play the role of norm changer?
Some scholars advocate private intervention.  For example, Carlson proposes
block leaders and written feedback as intervention techniques that can in-
crease participation in a recycling program by people otherwise not inclined
to participate, even though there is a curbside program in place making par-
ticipation easy.265  Carlson and others also write about how personal contact
can increase cooperation in situations where individuals receive little benefit
from collective cooperation.266  Personal contact increases norm internaliza-
tion, self-esteem, and “reputation-signaling opportunities” by “drawing on a
background norm of cooperation.”267  Geisinger suggests that “ingroup
members” of a social group who represent the group, but do not have to
change their own behavior, play this role.268  Group identity creates a behav-
ioral stereotype that is more pronounced than the individual’s identity, lead-
ing the individual to conform to the group’s behavior.269  Perhaps Finnemore
and Sikkink’s norm leaders or Sunstein’s norm entrepreneurs can be the ex-
ternal force leading to norm emergence or change.
Beyond trying to figure out who or what should be the engine of norm
creation or change and how to get people to internalize new norms, there are
unique problems with the environmental protection norm that may also con-
tribute to the reluctance of people to adhere to it and become good environ-
262 Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 379 (“Nongovernmental organizations may be R
more effective than either individuals or governments [in creating or changing norms].”); see
also id. at 382; Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 123 n.241 (stating that informal sanctions, like R
family disapproval, have a greater effect on compliance than formal sanctions). But see Posner
& Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 381 (stating that the government can foster norm creation by R
instilling guilt and shame in both children and adults.).
263 See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 378 (“Without public intervention, many R
norms change only gradually or not at all.”).
264 See id. at 381-82.
265 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1287-89; see also id. at 1298 (explaining that when conserv- R
ing energy requires sustained behavioral change, information about energy use and rebates for
energy conservation may improve compliant behavior); Shuman, supra note 74, at 158 (dis- R
cussing the importance of communication about damage awards in tort cases to lessen tortious
behavior).
266 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1289; see also id. at 1245 (arguing that personal contact is R
important for resolving collective action problems on a sustained basis); id. at 1280 (sug-
gesting “anonymity” of large apartment buildings “may decrease any sense of community the
neighbors share and may, therefore, lead to a lower commitment to collective action like re-
cycling”); Miller, supra note 139, at 906 (emphasizing the importance of repeated personal R
encounters to deterring inappropriate behavior); Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 75 R
(“[I]nformation that induces the decision-maker to focus on an internal norm also may lead to
actual or perceived increases in external norm enforcement by others.”).
267 Id. at 1291.
268 See Geisinger, supra note 103, at 652; see also id. at 614. R
269 See id. at 638.
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mental citizens.  First, the abstract environmental protection norm may not
be sufficiently robust or widely enough held to overcome all the barriers to
responsible environmental behavior noted previously and activate concrete
personal norms favoring specific beneficial environmental action.270
“[Norms] ‘come in varying strengths’ with different norms commanding
different levels of agreement.”271  Therefore, within an individual, there may
be conflicting norms competing for control of that individual’s behavior,272
any one of which might command greater community or social approval.
These norms may trump the environmental protection norm and cause the
individual to behave in an environmentally irresponsible manner.
Thus, if people adhere to what Vandenbergh calls the “autonomy
norm,”273 they may be less likely to increase their compliance in response to
threatened formal legal sanctions.274 “Instead, when the freedom to conduct
an activity is very important, individuals may react to increased threats to
restrict that freedom by simply increasing their commitment to the illegal
activity.”275  Additionally, if people perceive that they are not being treated
fairly, their good behavior is not being rewarded, or the bad behavior of
others is not being sanctioned,276 then the impetus to adhere to a norm of
good behavior may be lessened.277  Vandenbergh calls this the “reciprocity
norm,”278 the desire to cooperate if one believes that others are cooperating
as well.  The reciprocity norm is widespread like the environmental protec-
tion norm.279  “‘All reciprocity norms share the common ingredients that
individuals tend to react to the positive actions of others with positive re-
sponses and to the negative actions of others with negative responses.’” 280
However, if the observer does not know the reason for the individual’s com-
pliant or noncompliant behavior, the force of the observation may be lost.281
270 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 207. R
271 See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 892. R
272 See id., at 897 (“[N]ew norms never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a
highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions
of interest.”).
273 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 99 (explaining that the “autonomy norm” is the desire R
to be left alone).
274 Id. at 101.
275 Id. at 101; see also id. at 102 (discussing how Texas environmental regulators use the
autonomy norm to great effect in their “Don’t Mess with Texas” anti-littering program).  A
description of the Texas program is available at http://www.dontmesswithtexas.org/home.php.
276 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 108; see also id. at 129 (“Chester Bowles, the Admin- R
istrator of the Office of Price Administration during the Second World War, asserted that 20%
of the regulated community will automatically comply with any regulation just because it is
the law, 5% will seek to evade the regulation, and the remaining 75% will comply as long as
they believe that the evading five percent will be caught and punished.”).
277 Id. at 104.
278 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1118-19. R
279 Id. at 1106.
280 Id. at 1118 n.75 (quoting Elinor Ostrom, Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust,
Reciprocity, and Reputation, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM
EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 19, 46 (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2003)).
281 Posner, supra note 108, at 555. R
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Second, guilt being the primary “internal enforcement mechanism” in-
hibiting norm violations282 creates its own problems.  For example, the possi-
bility that there may be confusion about precisely what specific positive
behavior is required may make the norm ambiguous, which can lessen the
guilt an offender might otherwise feel from her deviant behavior.283  In addi-
tion, when there are external constraints on people engaging in the correct
behavior, they may resort to “mechanisms that neutralize guilt,” such as
“redefining the problem in a way that does not trigger the applicable norm,
asserting that others are to blame for the harm, or asserting that no alterna-
tives existed to the course of action taken.”284
Third, a norm of bad environmental behavior may take hold, for exam-
ple, if people observe other people wasting water or electricity, driving
SUVs, or littering.  Under such circumstances, there is little incentive for
observers to engage in good environmental practices, lest they be thought of
as a patsies or “dupe[s].”285  This behavior reflects the “norm of conform-
ity,”286 which arises because “people ‘frequently use the beliefs, attitudes,
and actions of others, particularly similar others, as a standard of comparison
against which to evaluate the correctness of their own beliefs, attitudes, and
actions.’” 287  The conformity norm is supported by social learning theory,
which teaches “that human behavior can best be explained by an interaction
of cognitive, behavioral, and environmental factors.  It assumes that people
learn behavior by observational learning: ‘[V]irtually all learning phenom-
ena resulting from direct experience occur on a vicarious basis by observing
other people’s behavior and its consequences for them.’” 288  Social learning
theory also teaches “that observing unpunished inappropriate behavior
282 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 83; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1241 R
(describing the guilt illegal users of HOV lanes feel because of the strength of the “I’d rather
be carpooling” norm and a general uneasiness about breaking the law).
283 See Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 85. R
284 Id. at 77.  Another version of this problem is that the sheer scope and size of environ-
mental problems may overwhelm people and leave them feeling helpless about their ability to
redress them.  Specter, supra note 122, at 53. R
285 See Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 112 (“[P]erceptions of widespread noncompliance R
undermine compliance.”); see also id. at 114 (“[C]ooperation decreases if compliers see
themselves as ‘dupes.’”); Carlson, supra note 95, at 1248-49; id. at 1289; Yang, supra note 99, R
at 1155  (ascribing the same problem to poor treaty enforcement).
286 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 112. R
287 Id. at 114 (quoting Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply, Norms, Values,
and Principles, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 200, 213 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds.,
1989)); see also id. at 112 n.198 (quoting Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Norma-
tive Conduct: Recycling the Concepts of Norms To Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015 (1990) (suggesting that the conformity norm “pro-
vides an efficient ‘decisional shortcut.’”)); Bruce A. Green, Taking Cues: Inferring Legality
from Others’ Conduct, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2006); cf. Vandenbergh, supra note
79, at 59-60 (noting that the government’s common practice of “bundling enforcement actions R
into a widely publicized national initiative” creates a risk that the message being conveyed is
one of widespread non-compliance, which could lead to more violations).
288 Shuman, supra note 74, at 157 (quoting ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY R
12 (1977)).
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reduces the inhibition to engage in that behavior . . .[,] ‘tends to increase
prohibited behavior in observers,’” 289 and undermines the social consensus
behind the rule.290  While one obvious way to increase people’s positive con-
forming behavior and individual compliance with a norm is positive feed-
back about how others are performing as well as their own performance,291 if
those engaging in the correct environmental behavior are seen as odd or just
a few committed environmentalists, then they are less likely to change their
behavior, unless the behavior pattern is widespread.292
Fourth, people may not want to change their behavior because they sim-
ply do not believe the reason for the behavior change or they question the
legitimacy of the norm.293  Sometimes what looks like a competition between
two or more norms over which should control an individual’s behavior may
simply be that person’s reluctance to change her behavior.  If the norm is not
widely enough shared, the esteem of others — the critical element leading to
norm internalization and behavior change — will not be there.294  “The evi-
dence suggests that esteem matters; many individuals care what others think
of them.”295  If no one sees the environmental norm compliant behavior
(e.g., not littering, driving to a hazardous waste disposal site to dispose of
toxic household cleansers, driving in the HOV lane or even taking the bus),
the positive regard of neighbors and friends is missing.296
Finally, personal self-regard matters.  If an individual can feel proud of
her good behavior, then she is more likely to engage in good behavior; if her
289 Id. at 158-59 (quoting BANDURA, supra note 288, at 121). R
290 Yang, supra note 99, at 1152 (saying treaty noncompliance can undermine the expres- R
sion of consensus about norms and interests reflected in a treaty by putting forth an “alterna-
tive normative universe”).
291 See Carlson, supra note 95, 1289-90 (saying a norm of cooperation may be triggered R
when households learn through feedback they are cooperating  less than their neighbors; alter-
natively, they may want to beat or at least equal, their neighbors’ performance).
292 See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 9, at 1705. R
293 See Christopher Deabler, The Normative and Legal Deficiencies of “Public Morality,”
19 J.L. & POL. 23, 34-35 (2003).
294 See Carlson, supra note 95, at 1232; id. at 1299 (noting that for high-effort behavior, R
norm internalization will increase the effort an invididual makes to recycle).
295 Id. at 1290 (“Cooperative behavior typically increases when opportunities to communi-
cate esteem (or lack of it) increase . . . .”); Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 93 n.120 (saying R
“in many settings people desire to put forward their ‘socially responsible self’” to gain esteem
(quoting IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 33 (1992))).
296 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1299-1300 (saying face-to-face contact and behavioral feed- R
back increase the opportunities to signal or gain esteem); see also id. at 1279 (attributing
success of curbside recycling programs in part to their feature of making norm compliant
behavior visible to neighbors); Stern, supra note 162, at 10,788 (“[N]orm activation can be R
enhanced in a community context in which face-to-face communication, mutual interdepen-
dence, and the possibility for social influence can build interpersonal norms that buttress per-
sonal norms.”).
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actions do not generate that type of response, then the behavior will be simi-
larly negative.297
While there appears to be a reasonably strong correlation between
norms and behavior under the right circumstances, norms are not easy to
activate and enforce and even harder to create or change.  The government
and law can play some role in shaping the social meaning that forms the
basis of a norm, but the principle job of norm creation and activation proba-
bly belongs to non-government actors; Carlson’s block captains; Finnemore
and Sikkink’s norm leaders; or Sunstein’s norm entrepreneurs.  However,
their job is not an easy one, as norms alone may be weak motivators of
personal behavior improvement when barriers to norm change and behavior
exist, unless there is strong encouragement for change, such as the additional
persuasive tools discussed in the next part of this Article.
VI. ADDITIONAL “PERSUASIVE TOOLS” 298 TO
INDUCE BEHAVIORAL CHANGE
Assuming that a new norm of environmental responsibility is needed to
induce behavioral changes, the prior Sections have demonstrated how chal-
lenging it will be to activate and implement such a norm.  Therefore, this
Section of the Article discusses a variety of supplemental measures to assist
in that outcome.  The first portion of the Section describes various enforce-
ment approaches to changing norms, such as sanctions for norm deviant be-
havior and shaming conduct to motivate people to avoid certain behavior.
The second portion of the Section investigates non-enforcement approaches
to changing norms such as information and public education as well as mar-
ket based incentives.
No single approach can perform this task.299  Rather, a combination of
approaches may be necessary, the precise combination or number of which
may vary depending on the targeted behavior.300  The key is to pick ap-
proaches that will be “mutually reinforcing”301 and do not work at cross-
purposes.  A critical component of any package of approaches is providing
reliable, trustworthy, and timely information about the effects of individual
297 See Carlson, supra note 95, at 1283 (citing study that shows a positive “correlation” R
between the level of recycling intensity and the extent to which an individual feels proud about
being environmentally responsible).
298 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 67, at 898. R
299 Monroe, supra note 49, at 118; see also id. at 120 (listing thirteen initiatives for a R
successful campaign to establish specific conservation behavior).  Stern suggests that there are
many factors influencing environmental behavior, that “their effects are to some extent mutu-
ally dependent,” and that “contextual influences” such as “effective laws and regulations,
strong financial incentives or penalties, irresistible technology, [and] powerful social norms
. . .  can leave little room for personal factors” unless these “contextual influences are weak.”
Stern, supra note 162, at 10,786. R
300 Dernbach, supra note 20, at 132. R
301 Dernbach applies this concept to climate change legislation. Id.
\\server05\productn\H\HLE\33-1\HLE101.txt unknown Seq: 40 10-FEB-09 12:54
156 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 33
sources of pollution and behavior that also identifies alternative behavior
and presents incentives for improved behavior.302  This is true even though
information by itself cannot change behavior or induce the development of a
new or modified norm of personal behavior and may even be counter-indi-
cated where a quick change in public behavior is required.303
A. Enforcement Approaches to Changing Norms
Most scholars agree that some form of sanctions is necessary to punish
behavior that deviates from a norm; otherwise, behavior will not change.304
However, not all sanctions are successful.  Those that are successful are very
carefully designed.  One form of sanction, shaming, has received a lot of
attention, both positive and negative.  This part of the Article discusses both
the structure of sanctions in general and the particular use of one sanction:
shaming.
1. Sanctions for Norm Deviant Behavior
Sanctions for deviant behavior are necessary to produce norm-compli-
ant behavior.305  An active enforcement program signals that certain social
behavior is unacceptable306 and establishes the existence of “a normative
302 Id. at 144-51; see also Monroe, supra note 49, at 116 (noting the importance of spe- R
cific information); id. at 118 (suggesting inclusion of “information and reminders about the
consequences of doing the behavior, the social acceptability of the behavior,” the ease of
engaging in it, and the contribution of the behavior to solving the problem).
303 See Lazarus, supra note 22, at 39 (acknowledging importance of public education R
about climate change, but arguing that public education cannot be the sole means relied on to
effect changes of a more pressing nature); see also Monroe, supra note 49, at 118. R
304 See Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 369 (“The sanctions for the violation of a R
norm can be categorized as automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral costly, and multi-
lateral costly.”).  Posner and Rasmusen worry that information sanctions, which are closely
aligned to guilt and shame and transmit information about the violator she does not want
others to know, may be too draconian because they could lead to “ostracism,” which may go
beyond the offense’s “social cost.” Id. at 376. But see id. at 375 (discussing the efficiency of
informational sanctions because they “impose significant costs on the violator” while allowing
the enforcer to avoid the negative costs of having to confront the violator).
305 But see Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2032 (1996) (arguing that laws mandating behavior without a threat of enforcement
serve an important expressive function and can “reconstruct norms and the social meaning of
action”); Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 126 (arguing that formal legal sanctions may lessen R
environmental noncompliance, but only if moral restraints or internal norms are weak); id. at
125-26 (noting that the probability of detection has greater deterrent effect than the severity of
the penalty); Massaro, supra note 132, at 1896-97 (arguing that because each person exper- R
iences fear differently, criminal actions are not motivated by the criminal’s rational balancing
of utilities based on fear of some sanction).  For a contrasting perspective, see Posner & Ras-
musen, supra note 126, at 379 (“Heavy sanctions for violating a norm affect both norm change R
and who becomes a norm innovator.”); Geisinger, supra note 103, at 605 (“Norms, or behav- R
ioral rules supported by a pattern of informal sanctions, can serve both as a source of law and a
tool for effective behavioral change.”).
306 See Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 75. R
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community.”307  “Protecting and preserving normative communities” can
lessen the need for public or private norm enforcers and “have long-term
transformational benefits.”308
To be successful, the punishment for norm deviation must be propor-
tional, and there must be “alternatives or accommodations” for those whose
behavior deviates from the norm.309  Proportionality is consistent with the
fairness norm.  The availability of alternatives for those who want to deviate
from the norm makes it easier for those who already comply with the norm
to enforce it.  Providing easy alternatives for those inclined to ignore or even
breach social norms is another benefit; it increases the social pressure on
offenders to comply.310  Any sanction that is imposed must also have some
educational value.311  For example, if the reason to decrease solo commuting
is to lessen the contribution of cars to climate change, then any sanctions
directed at solo commuting, such as tolls, alternative driving days, or in-
creasing the use of HOV lanes, must directly lead to environmental improve-
ment if the sanction is to have any long-term educative effect beyond
increasing the short-term pain of solo commuting.
People are more likely to enforce norms and sanction deviant behavior
if the personal benefits of doing so exceed costs.312  People who enforce
widely held norms additionally “create a social benefit that others [and
they] enjoy.”313  Norm enforcers can also feel a sense of personal satisfac-
tion from preventing harmful social behavior.314  For these individuals, “vir-
tue is its own reward.”315  But enforcing norms is difficult and expensive,
307 See Yang, supra note 99, at 1152 (“Enforcement actions are necessary to affirm the R
existence and primacy of a common normative community to which all treaty parties belong,
including the violator.”).
308 See id. at 1153 (applying same thought to compliance with treaties).
309 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1276 (quoting Lessig, supra note 222, at 1030-31).  Fail- R
ure to strike the right balance in deterrence can be costly, because failing to deter negative
behavior may lead to serious risks, while over-deterring may add unnecessary costs or reduce
the availability of useful goods or services.  Shuman, supra note 74, at 167. R
310 Providing commuters with options that allow them to reach their destination on time
without breaking the law makes cheating “a less legitimate form of defiance.”  Strahilevitz,
supra note 2, at 1267. R
311 Lex talonis is an enforcement theory requiring the punishment of an individual to “mir-
ror” the harm she inflicted on others and requiring the offender to repair the injury she has
caused, thus morally educating the offender about the error of her ways. See Garvey, supra
note 250, at 739.  An example of a lex talonis sanction applied to someone who litters would R
be to require her to pick up litter along the side of the road to repair the harm she caused while
at the same time educating her about the consequences of her action.
312 Miller, supra note 139, at 908. R
313 Id. at 906.
314 Id. at 907.
315 Id.; see also Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of Emotional
Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DIS-
GUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)) (touting the role of “positive emotions,” like a sense of
internal pride, in improving decision making, especially in situations involving complex deci-
sions). But see Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1241 n.51 (noting idea of paying whistleblowers a R
bounty in lieu of relying on feel-good emotions); Yang, supra note 99, at 1166 (suggesting R
ways in which financial incentives may increase enforcement at the international level).
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requiring the norm enforcer to determine if “a norm has [actually] been
violated, expend the effort to administer a sanction, and bear the possibility
of retaliation by the accused.”316  According to Miller, the most significant
of these costs is the threat of retaliation by a hostile norm violator.317  Other
costs include the time spent observing and recording violations and monitor-
ing reformed behavior.
There are many excuses potential norm enforcers can and do use to
explain why they have elected not to enforce a norm.  For example, in addi-
tion to the exculpatory norms of noninterference, fairness, and equal treat-
ment, there is a general belief that “rules should be administered reasonably
in light of their purpose.”318  But there may be different interpretations of
what the norm actually means, as well as questions about whether the norm
is widely supported and “whether the rule in question is justified by princi-
ples to which any right-thinking person would subscribe.”319  If the norm’s
meaning is uncertain, it may be hard to determine if the actor’s behavior has
actually violated the norm320 and what sanction, if any, should be applied.321
For example, fines as an enforcement tool for norm violations are morally
“ambiguous” because they create the impression that “an offender can buy
his way out of punishment.”322  When there are competing norms, as in the
case of the solo commuting and carpooling norms, compliance becomes
more problematic and enforcement less likely.323  Christine Parker also
warns that if political support for the enforcer’s “view of the law” is absent,
316 Miller, supra note 139, at 904; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 87 n.98 (ex- R
plaining how problems gathering information on whether a norm has been violated can affect
external norm sanctioning).  For this reason, it is also important that “application of a sanction
not require too much information” in order to be activated.  Posner & Rasmusen, supra note
126, at 372. R
317 Miller, supra note 139, at 904; see also Yang, supra note 99, at 1166 (listing the R
potential for retaliatory action as a cost of treaty enforcement and concluding it is more impor-
tant than the administrative costs of pursuing an enforcement action).
318 Miller, supra note 139, at 911-13. R
319 Id. at 899; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1289 (polluters’ violation of a confus- R
ing law may be excused or tolerated as opposed to being viewed as socially unacceptable).
320 Miller, supra note 139, at 899. R
321 Id. at 915.
322 See Garvey, supra note 243, at 745 (“[M]ost of us don’t think criminal acts should be R
subject to market logic.”); see also Christine Parker, The Compliance Trap: The Moral Mes-
sage in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement, 40 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 591, 592 (2006); Daniel
M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 380-81 (1999) (“The problem with fines
is less the perception that they are ineffective deterrents than the perception that they are
ineffective symbols of disapprobation . . . .  Fines . . . are open to the interpretation that society
is attaching a price tag to, rather than prohibiting, the punished behavior: we cannot condemn
someone morally for buying what we are willing to sell, even if we are charging a high price
for it.”). But see Drew Feeley, Personality, Environment, and the Causes of White-Collar
Crime, 30 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 201, 210-11 (2006) (praising fines because, by putting the
burden solely on the offender, they save government resources and, if large enough, “will
offset the value of committing the crime”).
323 See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1242. R
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and the meaning of compliance is “politically contested,” there is nothing
the enforcer can do to to improve compliance.324
If the goal of the enforcement action is to transform a new behavior into
a habit, additional steps may be required to make the new habit as “useful or
attractive as the old habit.”325  The violator must also be made aware of her
actions through some type of communication by the norm enforcer.  How-
ever, this communication increases the risk of a distressing confrontation
with the offender, often a stranger whose inclination toward violence may be
unknown.326
Regardless of which specific sanction is applied, publication of the
norm violation and sanction is critical if more than just the violator’s behav-
ior is going to be changed.327  But doing this implicates the norm of privacy,
which many consider a higher good.  The privacy norm can decrease the
effectiveness of other norms “by depriving neighbors, acquaintances, gos-
sips, and scandal sheets of the information needed for shame, informational,
and multilateral sanctions.”328
2. Shaming Conduct That Does Not Align with Norms
Shame as a specific method of enforcing norms has drawn both
favorable and unfavorable comment.329  Shaming sanctions are generally ap-
324 Parker, supra note 319, at 611. R
325 See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 596. R
326 Miller, supra note 139, at 905-06; see also id. at 925-29 (describing the different levels R
of hostility associated with various ways of confronting offenders, from the relatively benign
to direct confrontation).
327 See id. at 372 (stating that “[i]f punishment will not be effective unless many people
learn about the violation, there may be no punishment at all”); see also Vandenbergh, supra
note 82, at 79 (noting that “[a]n enforcement intervention may activate some or all of the R
norms relevant to environmental compliance, if it provides information about the conse-
quences of a noncompliant act and the individual’s responsibility for or ability to prevent those
consequences”); Massaro, supra note 132, at 1901-02 (arguing that the efficacy of shame as a R
sanction requires witnesses who observe or learn of the shameful act and who will then cen-
sure it).
328 Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 381; see also Posner, supra note 108, at 558 R
(stating that the legal protection accorded privacy undermines regulation by social norms,
which requires that observers be able to detect the violation).
329 Many scholars have written about the effectiveness of shaming as an enforcement tool.
For those simply describing what shaming is, see Joshua Andrix, Negotiated Shame: An In-
quiry into the Efficacy of Settlement in Imposing Publicity Sanctions on Corporations, Note,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1857, 1865-66 (2007) (describing shaming as a process by which people
draw attention to bad acts); Garvey, supra note 243, at 738 (distinguishing between shaming R
penalties that rely on public exposure and those that seek to educate); Deni Smith Garcia,
Three Worlds Collide: A Novel Approach to the Law, Literature, and Psychology of Shame, 6
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 105, 121 (1999) (explaining that the emotional content of shame
ranges from embarrassment to mortification); Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in
Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 959, 972-73 (1999) (discussing the connection
between shaming and the offender’s morality and the role of “reintegrative” shaming).  For
those writing in support of shaming, see Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 383 (saying R
shaming gratifies public desire to condemn the offender); Karp, supra note 91, at 310-11 R
(saying shaming reinforces the moral order); Huang & Anderson, supra note 315, at 1064 R
(saying shame can have a “constructive role to play in human interactions”).  For those oppos-
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plied to sexual, moral, and commercial offenses, as well as initial or minor
infractions, such as shoplifting or drunk driving.330  However, there is no
immediately apparent reason to think that shame might not work as a deter-
rent to bad environmental behavior.
After all, there are many positive features of using shame to sanction
bad behavior.  Shame is one of the principal reasons people obey the law.
Shame can encourage children and adults to avoid harmful behaviors and
exercise self-control.331  The “expressive function of shaming sanctions”
may deter bad behavior by having an educative function that alerts people to
bad behavior and simultaneously “instills aversions to such behavior.”332
For example, “labeling someone a litterer subjects him or her to a stereotypi-
cal perception of character that is likely to be much more egregious along
relevant dimensions than the person’s acts would suggest.”333  Because such
labeling treats everyone who litters in the same way “by connecting them to
a particular stereotypical vision” of their behavior, the person who considers
herself an environmentalist will suffer more because she does not see herself
as someone who litters.  An environmentalist will also be more sensitive to
being perceived by her community as someone who ignores environmental
norms like littering or not recycling.334  On the other hand, people who have
not internalized the non-littering social norm will be affected very little by
negative labeling.335
Shaming is also cheaper than imprisonment because the costs of sham-
ing, like gossiping, are borne by the community or, in some cases, by the
norm violator, such as requiring an offender to post a sign on her lawn
describing her offensive behavior.336  Shaming can deter bad behavior by
curtailing to some limited extent the offender’s freedom to repeat the offense
and by creating “an unpleasant emotional experience for the offender, which
ing shaming, see Whitman, supra note 233, at 1059 (describing shaming as “lynch justice” R
and something that “involve[s] an ugly, and politically dangerous, complicity between the
state and the crowd”); Miller, supra note 139, at 920 (saying shaming is “significantly more R
adverserial” than giving a norm violator advice or admonishing her norm-deviant behavior).
330 Whitman, supra note 233, at 1064.  Even though the offense is criminal in nature, the R
use of a shaming sanction reflects the fact that the community does not yet think of the of-
fender as part of a criminal class. Id. at 1067.
331 Huang & Anderson, supra note 315, at 1064. R
332 Andrix, supra note 329, at 1866. But cf. Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 379 R
(likening shaming and the resultant public humiliation of offenders to “real life morality plays
in which the public vividly experiences the important emotions — anger, contempt, pity, dis-
gust, and fear — that maintain cooperative relations”).
333 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 649; see also Garvey, supra note 243, at 743 (listing R
examples of ways to publicize an offender’s actions: requiring her to place a sign on her lawn
describing the offense or wear a sign in public, placing an ad in a local newsletter or posting a
message describing the offending action on the internet).
334 Miller, supra note 139, at 924 (“[T]he efficacy of shame depends on the vulnerability R
of the violator to being judged as inadequate by the community.”).
335 Geisinger, supra note 103, at 649.  But see Garvey, supra note 243, at 784 (“[Visual R
stigmas] may successfully condemn and shame.  They may even be effective deterrents, but
they do little to educate.”).
336 Cf. Feeley, supra note 322, at 212 (noting also that the “stigma” of shame imposed on R
the offender lasts longer than “the burden of paying a fine”).
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potential offenders will want to avoid and actual offenders will want to
avoid repeating,” especially if the community gossips about or shuns her.337
As shaming penalties are based in large part on a moral consensus in the
community that the individual’s behavior is wrong, they are a very visible
way of expressing that consensus.338  When the deterrent value of shaming is
added to “the moralizing effects of widespread publicity of offenders’
wrongdoing,” shaming performs an educative function for the community
and thus may contribute to maintaining social order.339
On the other hand, shaming displays significant hostility toward norm
violators and is much more hostile than other types of sanctions.340  Convey-
ing the observers’ “moral revulsion” about the person’s behavior is essential
if shaming is to have any effect, which is why merely gossiping about the
person’s behavior may not be sufficient.341  When people feel shame, it is
because they have “lowered” themselves in their “own eyes or in the eyes
of other people.”342  Since the quintessence of a shaming penalty is to dimin-
ish the individual’s status by embarrassing and humiliating her,343 the conse-
quences of shaming are extremely unpleasant for those who care about the
respect of their peers or community.  Shame can not only cause a “crippling
diminishment of self-esteem” for anyone subjected to shaming, but also
bring about financial hardship in any job that is dependent on a good
reputation.344
Shaming signals that a norm violator is not considered a worthwhile
member of a community by excluding her from that community.345  Since
the effectiveness of shaming sanctions depends upon the target losing status
337 Garvey, supra note 243, at 751-52. R
338 See Andrix, supra note 329, at 1866 (“[S]haming punishments serve to expressly R
communicate the message that society morally condemns an offender’s assessment of the bal-
ance of values.”); id. at 1865-66; see also Massaro, supra note 132, at 1898 n.87 (arguing that R
success of crime prevention depends on a widely accepted legal system embodying a consen-
sus of values and procedures that guarantees equal and fair enforcement). But see id. at 1884
(“Public shaming [is] a retributive spectacle that is devoid of other positive community-ex-
pressive or community-reinforcing content.”); Jeffrey Abramson, Response to Professor
Kahan, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 56, 58 (1999) (noting that “shame may accomplish a morally
destructive task but it is not clear how it accomplishes a morally reconstructive task”).
339 Garvey, supra note 243, at 752. But see Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 373 R
(“[S]haming produces highly imperfect deterrence.”); Barnard, supra note 329, at 973 R
(“Shaming is more pregnant with symbolic content than punishment.” (quoting John
Braithwaite, Shame and Modernity, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 72-73 (1993))).
340 Miller, supra note 139, at 920; see also Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 383 n.49 R
(arguing that people like shaming penalties in part because they allow them to express
outrage.).
341 Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 368-69; see also Andrix, supra note 329, at 1866. R
342 Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 126, at 371. R
343 Karp, supra note 91, at 304; Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 383; see also Geis- R
inger, supra note 103, at 611. But cf. Karp, supra note 91, at 304 (“[Shaming] captures the R
practical function of retribution by disallowing the offender the opportunity to profit from the
offending act.”).
344 Dan M. Kahan, Shaming White Collar Offenders, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 51, 52 (1999);
see also Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 370 (“[W]hile gossip and innuendo may damage R
a person’s reputation, shaming typically destroys it.”); Feeley, supra note 322, at 212. R
345 Karp, supra note 91, at 302. R
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in her community,346 a sense of belonging to a community is critical, whether
the community is her family, workplace, neighborhood, or identified group,
like environmentalists.  Therefore, for shaming to work, people must inter-
nalize community norms and hold the respect of their peers, family, and
community in high esteem.347  This, however, may not always be true.
Shaming involves a “dangerous willingness, on the part of the govern-
ment, to delegate part of its enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled
general populace, . . . a form of ‘lynch justice.’” 348  To some scholars, sham-
ing inspires an “atavistic reaction” in those who observe the shaming and
“appeals to the public’s lowest moral sensibilities, inviting ridicule and epi-
thets, stigma and outcasting.”349  James Whitman worries that shame can stir
up political “demons” and “carry all the dangers of a demagogic democratic
politics.”350  He writes about the offender’s loss of “transactional dignity,”
and the loss of the ability to deal with predictable “partners.”351  By charac-
terizing the offender instead of the offense, shame sanctions demote her to a
lower social status.352  In the shaming context, the public is free to use the
information about an offense any way it wishes, which can lead to shunning
in the workplace and the offender’s neighborhood.353  Shaming is a “direct
assault”354 on the offender’s dignity and the esteem of one’s peers, loss of
which may be irreversible and could extend to her family and friends.355
Problems can also arise with the effectiveness of shaming if the public
identifies with the offender.356  People observing the shaming must agree that
the person and the activity she engaged in are bad.  Otherwise they will not
346 Id. at 316.
347 See id. at 313-16 (discussing the relationship between social identity and shame).
348 Andrix, supra note 329, at 1869; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Shaming R
Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 105, 109 (2005); Whitman, supra
note 233, at 1059; Massaro, supra note 132, at 1920 (finding it “worrisome” to allow the R
government to search for and manipulate an “offender’s psychological core.”).
349 Karp, supra note 91, at 313. R
350 Whitman, supra note 233, at 1091; see also id. (“[W]e have far too little control over R
the tendency of the public to become either a mob or a collection of petty prison guards.”).
351 Id. at 1090.
352 Id. at 1090 n.155. But see Skeel, supra note 348, at 115 (arguing that even though R
shaming raises “dignity concerns,” it is appropriate if the conduct is “genuinely blamewor-
thy” and involves regulatory offenses like pollution, which are not as highly charged as race
discrimination); Garvey, supra note 243, at 758 (saying shaming penalties are no more degrad- R
ing than other forms of punishment).
353 Massaro, supra note 132, at 1937-38. R
354 Id. at 1942; see also id. at 1920 (“[shaming] redefines a person in a negative, often
irreversible, way.”).
355 Andrix, supra note 329, at 1870; see also Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 384 R
(arguing that the severity of shaming’s impacts could undermine the goal of making the penalty
proportionate to the offense.); Skeel, supra note 348, at 109 (stating that shaming seriously R
punishes some offenders and merely “glances off of those who are more immune to disci-
pline”); Garcia, supra note 329, at 117-18 (“[S]haming is particularly stigmatic to innocent R
third-party relations given the public nature of shaming.”); Massaro, supra note 132, at 1938, R
1932 n.250 (noting “the potential unfairness of stigma spillover . . . to . . . family or other
associates” and onto “innocent neighbors” from home-centered shaming sanctions, like lawn
signs).
356 Massaro, supra note 132, at 1933. R
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“ostracize” that person — in fact, they might applaud her and her individu-
alistic behavior, as in the case of the solo commuter, enhancing her reputa-
tion as a norm violator.357  Additionally, if the broader community does not
share the “same moral passions” as the shamer, then shaming will not rein-
force any broader moral order.358  So, if her neighbors believe it is all right to
dispose of waste oil down a storm drain, then putting a lawn sign on the
disposer’s property criticizing her for her action will have no effect and
could even provoke others to engage in the same behavior as a sign of soli-
darity.359  Shaming can backfire as the reduced status and public humiliation
may actually decrease the incentive to stop the behavior on the theory that
there is nothing else to lose.360  Shaming can create opportunity costs for the
person who is doing the shaming and monitoring costs to be sure the person
is carrying out her punishment (e.g., putting a lawn sign up describing her
bad behavior).361  Shaming is also “an inherently short-fused sanction”;
there is a risk that if shaming sanctions become too common, the public
interest in them will drop and with it their deterrent effect.362
Shaming without an audience is meaningless;363 moreover, the audience
must be composed of people who are important to the offender so that their
disapproval puts at risk an important relationship to her.364  Therefore, sham-
ing works best in “relatively bounded, close-knit communities, whose mem-
bers ‘don’t mind their own business’ and who rely on each other” because
these communities generally have the same well-known “moral or behavior
expectations” which bind their members together, including the offender.365
The community’s capacity to reinforce “socially correct behavior” is addi-
tionally important for shaming to work.366  However, conditions that are con-
357 Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 375; see also Garcia, supra note 329, at 118-19. R
358 Karp, supra note 91, at 310-11 (“[S]ocial sanctioning reinforces the moral order [by R
offering an opportunity] for the collective expression of shared moral passions, [strengthening
them] through mutual reinforcement and reassurance.”); see also Massaro, supra note 132, at R
1883 (identifying five conditions that must be satisfied for shaming to be “effective and mean-
ingful”). But see Abramson, supra note 338, at 58 (calling shaming penalties “Scarlet A” R
punishments that seek to change community norms in radical and controversial ways, not to
express them).
359 See Massaro, supra note 132, at 1933 (shaming can actually result in an increase in R
violations).
360 Id. at 1919.
361 Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 372 (discussing shaming’s “hidden costs”); see R
also id. at 369 (discussing other risks of shaming, such as retaliation by the target and loss of
personal reputation if people do not believe source of the shame, even though “it has a higher
return if successful”); Feeley, supra note 322, at 212 (discussing shaming’s monitoring costs). R
362 Massaro, supra note 132, at 1930-31 R
363 Id. at 1901.
364 Id. at 1902.
365 Id. at 1916 (quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 57
(1989)); see also Barnard, supra note 329, at 972; Whitman, supra note 233, at 1063 (stating R
that anonymity is especially true in cities from where “one can always escape”).
366 Massaro, supra note 132, at 1917; see also Andrix, supra note 329, at 1868 (stating R
that the lack of cohesiveness of modern American communities makes it difficult for these
communities to reinforce socially preferred behavior, making it unlikely that shaming sanc-
tions will work).
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ducive to shaming, like a strong feeling of social and communal
responsibility, together with close social connections and strong family ties,
do not describe the typical American community or even, perhaps, the typi-
cal American family.367  Classical liberal values, such as “individuality, in-
dependence, and autonomy,” (i.e., the solo commuter), rather than
“interdependence, community, or shared values,” create significant barriers
to shaming’s effectiveness.368
Shaming is an extremely powerful sanction.  However, it has anarchical
aspects and, depending on the individual’s sensitivity to, and need for, the
approval of her community, might have no effect at all, or be too extreme a
response to an act of environmental bad behavior, especially if there is no
guiding concrete norm telling her that her behavior is bad.  Therefore, the
effectiveness of shaming as a sanction for irresponsible environmental be-
havior seems problematic at best.
There are other reasons why shaming alone may be ineffective in the
case of environmentally deviant behavior.  First, since there is no common
understanding that an offender’s irresponsible environmental behavior is
bad, it stands to reason that shame will not work until such an understanding
emerges.  Second, it is highly unlikely that individuals will take onto them-
selves the tasks of shaming a friend, neighbor, or family member and fol-
lowing up with the offender to make sure that bad habits have not returned.
Third, any outside source of shaming, be it the government or some private
norm enforcer, will be resisted as unwarranted interference with private ac-
tivities, or worse yet, might provoke a hostile response.369  Fourth, even if the
offender is part of a community about which she cares a great deal, her
capacity to explain away her behavior to herself and blame others who are
commonly seen as the source of environmental problems, or to excuse her
behavior as being a minor part of a much larger problem, probably means
that she can blunt the effect of any shaming penalties.370  Fifth, there is a risk
367 Massaro, supra note 132, at 1916; see id. at 1922 (“[T]he social unit that is mainly R
responsible for inculcating cultural shame values, the family, is often missing, culturally iso-
lated, or dysfunctional.”); Skeel, supra note 348, at 108-09 (noting that both population diver- R
sity and political polarization in the United States pose challenges to the effectiveness of
shaming, while acknowledging that shaming may be effective in family or professional set-
tings where relationships are “intertwined” and personal reputations are very important).
368 Massaro, supra note 132, at 1924; see also id. at 1922-24 (listing other reasons sham- R
ing may not work well in the United States); id. at 1916-17 (saying that since shaming’s effec-
tiveness relies on whether the offender depends on her community for “social, economic, or
political support, or cannot leave the group easily,” it means the very rich, who are “insulated
by their wealth,” and the very poor, who “cannot afford to conform [or] have less ‘social
standing’ to lose,” are the most likely to “defy social norms and risk shaming sanctions”).
369 Kahan & Posner, supra note 322, at 375; see also id. at 375 (stating that shaming R
depends on “the cooperation of citizens for it to have any effect” and will not work if there are
“widespread doubts about the motives of government actors”).  This may explain why the
government is not an effective source of shame.
370 For example, while I might feel briefly embarrassed if my environmental law students
lined up at the entrance to the school’s garage complaining about my solo commuting to
school, I would not expect them to keep this up, and all of the devices I employ to shield my
behavior from internal criticism would more than likely keep me driving to work.
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that if shaming were to work, it could have a devastating effect on the indi-
vidual, losing any educative function of the penalty through either hostility
toward the source of the shame or withdrawal from the community.
Sanctioning norm violations is an important part of inducing people to
internalize norms and change their behavior.  However, to be effective, sanc-
tions should be proportionate to the deviant behavior, be accompanied by
information about how to engage in more appropriate behavior, perform an
educative function, and, if levied by individuals, provide sufficient personal
benefit for the norm enforcer to overcome the costs of enforcement.  Using
shame to sanction bad behavior can be problematic because of shaming’s
spillover effects, its potential to over-punish, and its reliance on the norm
violator having strong community ties.  Yet shame can also have positive
educative attributes and be very effective in some circumstances.  While ab-
stract and concrete environmental norms may themselves be clear, the re-
quired behavior to implement them may be less clear, lessening the
likelihood that any one individual will sanction another’s bad environmental
behavior.  Further, the existence of competing norms, such as the privacy
norm, the autonomy norm, and the reciprocity norm, may dissuade the en-
forcer from acting, as may the threat of a hostile reaction by the norm viola-
tor.  Nonetheless, sanctions remain a useful supplemental tool in any effort
to encourage norm and behavioral change.
B. Non-Enforcement Approaches to Changing Norms and Behavior
Rewarding people for positive behavior may secure norm or behavioral
changes better than negative sanctions for bad behavior.  Aggressive en-
forcement can backfire and undermine social norms.371  A benefit of a more
cooperative, less aggressive response to norm breaches is that they offer “ex
ante approaches that seek to prevent noncompliance from occurring in the
first place.”372  Set forth below are two such approaches:  (1) information
and public education; and (2) market-based incentives.373
1. Information and Public Education
Scholars are divided on education’s potential to change individual be-
havior.  Some believe that with the right amount of public education, behav-
ior will change partly because they consider other ways of inducing people
371 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 84-85 (stating that aggressive enforcement against R
“well-intentioned business managers” can contribute “to a perception of regulatory unreason-
ableness,” lessening the managers’ desire to be law-abiding and undermining abstract norms of
social responsibility).
372 Yang, supra note 99, at 1158. R
373 Two other approaches to changing norms and behavior not discussed in the text are tort
liability and commodification.  For a critical view of using liability to improve individual envi-
ronmental behavior, see Stewart, supra note 42, at 97; Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 603-04; R
Shuman, supra note 74, at 126-27.  On commodification, see Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at R
1292 (applauding San Diego’s FasTrak system).
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to change their behavior less “palatable.”374  Others find little empirical sup-
port for these claims.375  Relying on information to educate the public is
challenging given the difficulties people have in accurately processing the
information they receive and then acting in conformance with that new in-
formation.376  As shown in Section III of this Article, people use a variety of
heuristics to process and internalize information, especially information
about risk, which may distort the information’s accuracy.  Additionally, the
effectiveness of information strategies for changing behavior depends in part
on the degree to which the target audience has been environmentally
“socialized.”377
Despite these challenges, information can play a pivotal role in chang-
ing negative actions into those that are more positive.378  Cultivating environ-
mental literacy, the “knowledge, attitudes, skill, and behaviors to be
competent and responsible,”379 is more effective over time than campaigns
to change specific behavior, according to Monroe.380  She suggests that a
new norm may arise if information is presented about the benefits other peo-
ple have realized as a result of implementing the new behavior.381  Monroe
recommends two strategies for improving the effectiveness of information:
social marketing tools applied to change a specific behavior “in a carefully
targeted audience;” and the cultivation of environmental literacy “through
selected educational programs that lead to knowledge, attitudes, skills, and
ultimately but not immediately, environmental behaviors.”382  Vandenbergh
says that norms will be activated and behavior changed when an individual
374 See Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 216 n.123. R
375 See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 74, at 163 (stating that the task of educating members of R
the public to accurately calculate the risks of their behavior seems “insurmountable”);
Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1116 n.68 (stating that while attempts to create or shift abstract
norms through school curricula are important, studies show that the critical abstract norms that
are important for changing environmental behavior in negative-payoff, loose-knit groups al-
ready exist).
376 Stewart, supra note 42, at 141 (arguing that people do not have the time, energy, or R
attention to pay to information collected by regulatory authorities); see also Taka´cs-Sa´nta,
supra note 4, at 30 (listing among barriers to obtaining information about environmental harms R
lack of direct interaction with the environment, imperceptible nature of environmental impacts,
“habituation” to a degraded environment, slow pace of negative environmental changes, phys-
ical distance between the environmental problem and where people live or work, and “the
distancing effect of technologies,” which prevent people from directly experiencing their own
environment); Henry, supra note 73, at 29 (noting the challenge of making environmental R
information “salient to the public, a public with knowledge that is roughly right but can easily
be confused and misdirected about detail”).
377 See Stewart, supra note 42, at 135; Monroe, supra note 49, at 115 (defining “environ- R
mental literacy,” as possessing “knowledge, attitudes, skill, and behaviors” to make the cor-
rect environment choices).
378 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1127 (stating that studies show that information about R
the aggregate effects of individual behavior can activate norms and change behavior).
379 Monroe, supra note 49, at 115 (citing J.F. Disinger & C.E. Roth, Environmental Liter- R
acy, ERIC/CSMEE DIGEST, Educational Resources Information Center Clearinghouse for Sci-
ence, Mathematics, and Environmental Education (1992)).
380 Monroe, supra note 49, at 117. R
381 Id. at 119.
382 Id. at 123.
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believes that her behavior is the cause of an environmental problem and that
a change in that behavior will lessen the problem.383  He cites empirical stud-
ies suggesting that adroitly presented information, by itself or together with
other regulatory instruments, may affect individual behavior.384
Vandenbergh’s belief in the ability of information to work as a motivational
force is premised on the information connecting the individual’s behavior to
the environmental problem.385
However, people may not change their behavior unless they believe
others are “doing their fair share.”386  Information must also show that
“others have reciprocated or will reciprocate” and, therefore, that “the indi-
vidual is not a sucker” if she behaves responsibly.387  In other words, infor-
mation will have a higher likelihood of inducing responsible environmental
behavior when a person recognizes that she has contributed to an environ-
mental problem and knows that other sources of the problem have changed
or committed to changing their behavior out of a sense of doing their “fair
share” to lessen the problem.388  Collecting information about what other
people are doing can be costly and intrusive.389
Schultz and Zelezny suggest that environmental information must
“resonat[e] with the values of the recipient,” especially with people who
have self-enhancing values, such as material and personal success and inde-
pendence.390  Stern adds that information is most effective “when it arrives
at the time and place of decision, is linked to the available choices, is deliv-
ered from trusted sources, and is delivered personally.”391  Carlson believes
that government-directed “[i]nformation campaigns may increase knowl-
edge and signal the importance of desired behavior,”392 but to be effective,
383 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1123-24. R
384 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 521. R
385 See Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1129 (“[I]f individuals believe that the mean, ag- R
gregate and relative effects of their behavior are not substantial, concrete norms linked to the
environment protection and reciprocity norms will not be activated and little pro-environmen-
tal behavior will occur.”); see also Schultz & Zelezny, supra note 54, at 131 (“The environ- R
mental problems that attract the most interest and concern are those that can directly affect the
individual or people to whom the individual has a direct connection.”).
386 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1124. R
387 Id.
388 Id.; see also id. at 1123 (“[D]isclosure of information that is targeted at the types of
beliefs that activate norms . . . when applied to environmental behavior [can have a more
direct effect on belief change].”).
389 Id. at 1123 (“[G]athering information on the contribution of any one individual often
is prohibitively expensive and intrusive.”); see also Roy, supra note 12, at 198 (“[T]he cost R
of good information in this [pollutant disposal] market puts good information beyond the
reach of many firms.”). But see Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 530 (“[I]nformation disclosure R
may be less expensive for regulators and regulated entities than command and control require-
ments, may be more flexible and efficient than command and control or market mechanisms,
and may enhance deliberative democracy.”).
390 Schultz & Zelezny, supra note 54, at 134; see also id. at 131 (criticizing environmental R
messages for stressing altruism because they ask people to “give up personal convenience or
comfort in order to address the problem”).
391 Stern, supra note 162, at 10,789. R
392 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1285; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1106. R
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the information must inform the person what the correct behavior is.393
Stewart talks about the use of “eco-labels” as a source of information for
consumers, but acknowledges the lack of consumer interest in them.394
Vandenbergh echoes that thought and says that neither environmental norm
campaigns nor product labels have an effect on personal behavior “in nega-
tive-payoff, loose-knit group situations” where changing behavior calls for
long-term or significant effort.395  Moreover, the effectiveness of labels is
limited to situations involving product choices, such as deciding whether to
buy an SUV or a hybrid car as opposed to driving or taking public
transportation.396
How information is presented has a direct effect on how people react to
it.397  “Durable behavior, which is the result of effortful information process-
ing (i.e. elaboration), is more achievable when cognitive involvement is
high, arguments are strong, sources are credible, topics are relevant, message
is clear, distractions are few, and comparisons are favorable.”398  The prob-
lem with trying to educate people about environmental risks is that the un-
derlying information rarely meets those criteria.  It is contentious, complex,
contestable, and frequently from non-credible sources.  The sheer complex-
ity and volume of often conflicting information about environmental harms
makes it extremely difficult to convey the magnitude of a particular environ-
mental risk.399  Information overload, which is common in the environmental
area, can overwhelm people or cause them to tune out.400
393 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1296-97 (explaining that face-to-face communication and R
feedback mechanisms result in greater norm compliance than the provision of information).
394 Stewart, supra note 42, at 139; see also id. at 137 (“Eco-labels need to be recognizable R
and believable.  Consumers must know what the label means and trust it.”); id. at 97 (noting
the problems associated with providing accurate and concise information on environmental
performance to consumers and the fact that no one knows yet about the willingness of consum-
ers to pay more for green products and services); Eric Pfanner, Cooling Off on Dubious Eco-
Friendly Claims, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2008, at C3 (noting that within a year green marketing
“while booming, has lost some of its cachet” due to “the public’s growing skepticism over ads
with environmental messages”).
395 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1132 (stating that the failure to convey information that R
will activate the environmental and responsibility norms may be responsible for the limited
effect of norm campaigns and product labels and not reflect any inherent weakness in the
ability of norms to influence behavior); see also id. at 1134-35 (noting that eco-labels have
minimal impact on consumers unless all other factors, such as the product’s price and quality,
are the same).
396 Id. at 1138 n.158 (“[T]he focus of eco-labeling on the consumer’s point of purchase
for a vehicle will miss the effects that arise from driving style, such as driving speed and
idling.”).  For example, product information accompanying hybrid cars does not inform a pro-
spective purchaser that driving less will save as much fuel.
397 Shuman, supra note 74, at 162. R
398 Monroe, supra note 49, at 119. R
399 Stewart, supra note 42, at 141. R
400 Id. at 140; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 592 n.287 (“With respect to informa- R
tion, less may be more.  If information is not provided in a clear and usable form, it may
actually make people less knowledgeable than they were before, producing overreactions, or
underreactions, based on an ability to understand what the information actually means.” (quot-
ing Cass R. Sunstein, Information Regulations and Informational Standing: Adkins and Be-
yond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 627 (1999))).
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The result can be “green-fatigue”401 and the marginalization of infor-
mation about environmental harm.402  The fear of this marginalization leads
to a tendency to simplify the environmental message and use alarmist lan-
guage to catch the public’s attention.403  For example, in the case of global
climate change, the complexities surrounding the issue led scientists and
technical experts to dominate the debate,404 effectively keeping the public at
bay.  Not until there were pictures of receding glaciers and swimming polar
bears did the public perception of the seriousness of the problem begin to
develop.  Yet
[s]tudies indicate that . . . hortatory information that highlights the
individual’s personal obligation to act . . . can have a “boomerang
effect.”  Instead of changing behavior, the information may induce
the individual to believe that she will feel less satisfaction if she
alters her behavior or to believe that her personal freedom is being
restricted.405
But purely “descriptive information” has little chance for success unless the
behavior the individual is engaging in is not in her interests and is not driven
by “ingrained habits.”406  The converse is true when the change in behavior
will have a direct beneficial impact on the individual, such as using a seat
belt.407
How activities are depicted may also affect individual behavior.  For
example, Strahilevitz suggests that to strengthen carpooling norms, it may
make more sense in the short term “to label solo driving a financially waste-
ful activity, rather than an environmentally insensitive activity.”408  Lessig
suggests that “the social meaning of an action can be changed by tying de-
sired new concepts or actions to concepts that are already popular,” using as
an example the “Chesapeake Bay Watershed — Don’t Dump” stencils on
401 Williams, supra note 123, at 8 (quoting Jen Boulder). R
402 Carl Pope, Executive Director of the Sierra Club, acknowledges that “today’s media
environment is an extremely crowded one, and message overload is the order of the day.” Id.
(quoting Carl Pope).
403 For further discussion of the effects of using alarmist language, see Stern, supra note
162, at 10,789. R
404 Yang, supra note 99, at 1147. R
405 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1138; see also id. at 1136 (noting that environmental R
campaigns mostly use hortatory language telling people that they must act, instead of provid-
ing information about their role in the problem as compared to other sources).
406 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 610; see also id. at 608 (explaining that straightforward, R
unembellished disclosure of data may cause an individual to change her behavior by influenc-
ing her understanding of the costs and benefits of particular actions, or by influencing personal
and social norms); Taka´cs-Sa´nta, supra note 4, at 31-32 (criticizing the media for presenting R
environmental information in a way that defends the status quo, fails to inform the public
about problems or risks, or overwhelms the public with information).
407 See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 521 n.13. R
408 Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1277. R
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storm drains.409  Alternatively, “undesired concepts or actions can be tied to
unpopular concepts.”410  Vandenbergh suggests that compliance with envi-
ronmental laws might improve if the government described the harms to
human health and the environment that would be avoided as a result of a
particular enforcement initiative, instead of boasting about the size of the
fine or how much pollution was prevented.411  A less direct approach to im-
prove environmental behavior is for the government to create the circum-
stances in which the meaning of an individual’s action becomes
“ambiguous.”412  “This ambiguation [sic] of social meaning then may un-
dercut the [positive nature of the] act . . . . [It may also] blunt the social
meaning of individual actions that currently convey positive social meaning
but harm the environment.”413
Therefore, while there are clear challenges in trying to educate the pub-
lic about its role in harming the environment, these challenges appear to be
surmountable by carefully crafting the message.  The message must come
from a trusted and knowledgeable source and link individual action with
environmental harm in a believable way that resonates with the values and
other acknowledged concerns of the target audience.  Even those who are
critical of information as a means of creating new norms or changing indi-
vidual behavior recognize that public education has some role to play, just
that it should not be the only player.
2. Market-Based Incentives
There are many who support the idea of using market-based incentives
to change behavior.414  Many support using tax breaks, subsidies,415 trading
programs or credit systems, and disincentives, like pollution fees or taxes,
for this purpose, especially as an alternative to command and control ap-
proaches.416  Dernbach recommends the use of tax credits as well as various
409 Lessig, supra note 222, at 1009; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1292 (compli- R
menting San Diego’s FasTrak system for successfully tying programmatic norms to strong ex-
isting norms).
410 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 217. R
411 Vandenbergh, supra note 79, at 59; see also Parker, supra note 319, at 610-11 (sug- R
gesting that confronting businesses with the disjuncture between their behavior and their ideo-
logical support for complying with the law is more effective than economic penalties because
the latter can be easily harmonized with commercial reality).
412 Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 218 n.130. R
413 Id.
414 Kysar calls these approaches “ecological economics.”  Kysar, supra note 32, at 677. R
415 See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 606-07 (suggesting that government subsidies R
of “desired changes” in individual behavior may reduce pollution more than alternative strate-
gies). But see Kysar, supra note 32, at 705-08 (criticizing economic subsidies because they R
encourage unsustainable production and consumption by encouraging otherwise uneconomic
resource exploitation, and hide the true cost of resource intensive products within the general
tax burden).
416 See Stewart, supra note 42, at 150 (stating that economic incentive systems are more R
effective normative “signaling mechanisms” than regulatory programs); see also Kysar, supra
note 32, at 675-76 (stating that tradable permits, remedial taxes, information disclosure initia- R
tives, and other market-based tools represent the future of environmental regulation).
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incentives, especially when the behavior has considerable associated ex-
penditures, and even suggests lower taxes for people who can show that their
prior year’s activities were carbon neutral.417  However, Stern sounds a warn-
ing note that while financial incentives can be effective, this effectiveness
relies upon how the financial incentives are put into practice.418  He cautions
that getting people to change their behavior is more complex than any single
factor, especially if one is trying to influence a substantial portion of the
population.419
Influencing the price of a product or activity, as illustrated by the recent
change in driving habits and sales of SUVs and trucks with poor gas mileage
brought on by the spike in gas prices, can have a meaningful direct impact
on personal behavior.420  The recent spike in gas prices has resulted in a 4%
decline in driving, a “50-year high” in mass transit ridership, and has put
sales of SUVs “in free fall,” illustrating that “[e]verything has a price
point.”421  However, unless these changes are made permanent through the
internalization of a norm of responsible environmental behavior, and the
new behavior has become a habit, the bad behavior will return the moment
the price sinks back to a more affordable level.422  Furthermore, increasing
the cost of a product or consumer behavior will only affect the price-sensi-
tive segment of the population.  The wealthy will continue to over-consume,
so there will continue to be a market for products that are environmentally
destructive.  These products will continue to be a source of aspiration for
those who hope to afford them someday.
A problem with using trading or taxes for individual sources of pollu-
tion is that the sources are small and diffuse, can cause chronic harms, and
are spread out among victims, including nonhuman ones.423  Further, the task
of “[i]dentifying, distributing, and enforcing rights” to goods created under
trading or credit schemes would be massive and costly because of the num-
ber of people involved as well as the lack of a baseline for determination of
the initial allocation of credits.424  The number and characteristics of the peo-
417 Dernbach, supra note 20, at 152-53. R
418 Stern, supra note 162, at 10,789. R
419 Id.
420 See Charles Krauthammer, At $4, Everybody Gets Rational, WASH. POST, June 6, 2008,
at A19; see also Clifford Krauss, Driving Less, Americans Finally React to Sting of Gas
Prices, a Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2008, at C3 (suggesting that recent changes in gas
consumption, total vehicle miles traveled, light truck and hybrid car sales, and public transpor-
tation ridership may be the start of “an enduring trend”).
421 Krauthammer, supra note 420, at A19; see also id. (promoting the use of a gas tax to R
keep gas prices high and suppress demand); Vedantam, supra note 36, at A4 (stating that R
people are more sensitive to prices than they are to ethical and environmental concerns, and
observing that interest in hybrid cars surged when gas reached $4 a gallon). But see Carlson,
supra note 95, at 1293 (stating that reducing recycling barriers is “more effective than increas- R
ing the cost of garbage disposal”).
422 But see Krauss, supra note 420, at C3 (noting that climate change has pushed fuel R
efficiency to the forefront of public consciousness for the foreseeable future (citing Samantha
Gross, Cambridge Energy Research Associates)).
423 See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 601. R
424 Id.; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103-04. R
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ple who would be covered by such a trading scheme and the diffuse nature
of the harms would result in high transaction costs and little “Coasian bar-
gaining.”425  Vandenbergh not only finds the challenges of making such sys-
tems work in the case of individual behavior overwhelming,426 he also finds
“the social meaning effects of commodifying pollution” worrisome.427
There is a danger that implementing economic incentives might weaken the
personal or communal psychological advantages of carrying out a supportive
action and thereby deter the intended behavior.428  Additionally, there is al-
ways the danger of unintended consequences.  For example, the California
bottle bill failed to get support from those favoring curbside recycling be-
cause “container deposit laws . . . remove from curbside pickup the most
valuable recyclable material, and thus reduce municipal revenues from curb-
side programs.”429
While increasing the cost of bad behavior may have an effect,430 there is
almost universal agreement that using taxes to increase that cost will not
succeed.431  General public opposition to taxes in the United States creates an
almost insurmountable barrier to the enactment of new environmental
taxes.432  Additionally, no one knows how to value ecosystem goods and
services reliably, so applying a tax that reflects any diminishment on those
values seems problematic at best.433  Even presuming that scientists can cre-
ate exact models of the consequences of environmental harms and econo-
mists can accurately predict the associated costs, the price instruments, or
“Pigouvian taxes,” would not take into account the ethical decisions that are
made respecting the calculus of environmental harms inflicted upon society
425 Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 601; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103-04 R
(“[A]llowance schemes are difficult to develop and administer when the number of potential
market participants is large and the emissions from any one individual are minute.”).
426 Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103. R
427 See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 601-02 (“To the extent individual behavior is R
steered as much by norms as by legal sanctions or economic incentives . . . , a shift in the
meaning of certain individual behaviors from ‘polluting’ to something less value-laden may
generate a sub-optimal level of social control on individuals’ environmentally significant
behavior.”).
428 Id. at 608; see also Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 1290-91 (discussing Michael J. R
Sandel’s “norm-related argument against using tradable permit schemes to control emissions
[because] emissions trading may undermine the ability of the relevant community to deal with
common problems through a regime of shared sacrifice”).
429 Carlson, supra note 95, at 1267. But see id. at 1294 (finding that a combination of R
norms, deposit money, and “reputation-signaling” among other factors is responsible for the
success of bottle bills).
430 See Carlson, supra note 95, at 1297. R
431 But see Dernbach, supra note 20, at 129 (supporting increasing fossil fuel prices by a R
carbon or fuel tax, which “would permeate through the entire economy, driving a variety of
GHG-reducing behaviors”).
432 See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1103; Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 604 (call- R
ing environmental taxes “politically radioactive”).
433 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 32, at 687. R
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in years to come.434  Such taxes might also have a regressive effect on the
poor.435
Kysar proposes imposing a products liability regime, what he calls “en-
terprise liability,”436 which might result in the production of goods that are
either less environmentally harmful or priced out of the market.  James Salz-
man suggests that manufacturers be required to take back products when
their useful lifetime has expired, which might lead to the production of less
environmentally hazardous and resource intensive consumer goods and less
wasteful product packaging and other types of incidental waste.437  Such a
program might actually make product markets more efficient by encouraging
participants to reduce costs that they had not even realized existed.  It could
also inform consumers of the actual consequences of their consumption
choices, which might shift demand toward products that are less costly to
produce using the broadest possible meaning of that term.438
Of these approaches, the least feasible one seems to be implementing
some kind of trading program.  The problems associated with designing a
model to fit so many disparate and small sources of pollution, the costs of
gathering data as well as of implementing and enforcing the program, the
need to construct some form of bureaucracy at the local or state level to
oversee the workings of the program, and the loss of individual privacy all
seem like overwhelming problems.  However, other economic measures,
such as product pricing and taxes, despite their unpopularity, might be good
supplemental measures to induce a change in environmental norms and indi-
vidual behavior, if they are accompanied by accurate and reliable informa-
tion to explain their connection to an environmental problem and its
source.439
VII. CONCLUSION
The simple fact is that we can’t force people to be good; we can’t
beat them with a stick, the way we can a donkey or a horse.  Well,
434 Id. at 688.
435 Cf. Stewart, supra note 42, at 114-15 (noting that the scope of environmental taxes in R
northern Europe has been limited by factors including the fear of regressive impact on low-
income consumers).
436 Kysar, supra note 32, at 712. R
437 James Salzman, Sustainable Consumption and the Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 1243, 1270-77
(1997) (outlining the proposed take-back program).
438 Kysar, supra note 32, at 712-13. R
439 For other approaches to irresponsible individual environmental behavior, see, for ex-
ample, Vandenbergh, supra note 10, at 216-17 (suggesting new laws that focus on individuals); R
Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 1149 (proposing “Individual Toxics Release Inventory” to acti- R
vate  personal norms); id. at 1149-50 (suggesting EPA conduct annual surveys of individual
and household uses of toxic substances);  Kimmel, supra note 62, at 507 (proposing an “envi- R
ronmental impact index” to give consumers numerical information about the environmental
impacts of products they consume together with an “environmental impact tax” on consumers
to reflect the environmental costs of those goods).
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of course we can force them to do some things . . . . But what
happens when we put the stick away?440
Individual behavior is a continuing source of environmental harm, even
though people profess to believe in the abstract norm of environmental pro-
tection and support environmental causes.  Many of the reasons this disso-
nance persists are set out in this Article.  One solution is to create a new
norm of environmental responsibility; however, as this Article shows, this is
a daunting task   My first Article explored the happenstance of what I call a
second environmental republican moment:  the country’s increasing aware-
ness of, and concern about, the phenomenon of global climate change and
the pending environmental and socioeconomic crises.  During such mo-
ments, the public is more open to being taught about its civic responsibili-
ties.  Thus, the public’s attention to climate change provides a window in
which additional learning about individual responsibility for other environ-
mental harms is open, albeit perhaps only briefly.  But, as shown here, norm
creation and implementation are problematic processes, regardless of when
such efforts are undertaken, and may not lead to changes in personal behav-
ior, given the barriers in the way.
This Article, like the first, emphasizes the importance of public educa-
tion about the environmental consequences of individual behavior. That
Piece recommends that environmental groups function as norm entrepre-
neurs by teaching the public about their individual contributions to environ-
mental harm.  Here, I show how these groups might set off a norm cascade
leading to a change in both norms and individual behavior.  However, even
environmental groups armed with the best and most accessible information
during the occurrence of an environmental republican moment may not be
able to induce such changes without additional tools.  This Article has ana-
lyzed several of those tools, including shame and various market-based in-
centives like trading or increasing the cost of a product or particular
behavior.  Although by themselves each has problems, the possibility re-
mains that these supplemental methods, combined with public education,
might be sufficient to achieve both norm and behavior change, when tailored
to meet the particular harm and target audience.
Thus, for example, the application of shame by itself is problematic,
given the anarchical aspects of shaming sanctions, their potential spillover
affects, and the difficulties of imposing them successfully.  Similarly, while
market-based incentives like increasing the cost of engaging in certain be-
havior might have an impact on price-sensitive members of the public, their
long-term effect is uncertain unless additional steps are taken to internalize
new habits, and their impact might be regressive.  Trading, given the myriad
of problems associated with its application to individuals, seems the least
likely of the proposed economic approaches to change individual environ-
mental behavior.  On the other hand, if having readily available, cost-effec-
440 DONNA LEON, THE GIRL OF HIS DREAMS 81 (2008).
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tive alternative practices or products, such as those that might result from
Salzman’s “take back initiative” or price increases, helps people to internal-
ize a new behavioral norm and form good habits, then finding ways to en-
courage the development of those alternatives may be key.  For those whose
economic status makes them insensitive to cost, shaming or maximizing per-
sonal guilt, like the successful campaign of animal rights activists to elimi-
nate the market for fur coats, might be an effective way to encourage the
creation of a new or revised norm of individual environmental responsibility
and more environmentally benign behavior.
Not surprisingly, there is no single answer or silver bullet that will mag-
ically transform poor environmental behavior into good behavior.  One thing
by now should be apparent, and that is that public education must be a cen-
tral part of any effort to change behavior whether as part of an effort to
sanction deviant behavior, use economic incentives, or directly inform the
public about the consequences of their action.  Otherwise, a norm of individ-
ual environmental responsibility will not emerge, and new good behaviors
will not replace those supported by bad habits.  One other thing is certain:
much hard work lies ahead for norm entrepreneurs who have a limited time
within which to make people behave more environmentally responsibly.
Neither environmental republican moments nor the planet, apparently, last
forever.
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